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LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND SHIFTING POWER 
RELATIONS 
Bert-Jaap Koops† 
“I thought he was going to get pneumonia, but actually he said in 
his letter it wasn’t the cold that bothered him, it was being watched 
all the time. The eye in the door.” . . . This eye, where no eye 
should have been, was deeply disturbing to Prior. . . . “That’s 
horrible,” he said, turning back to Beattie. “ ’S not so bad long as it 
stays in the door.” She tapped the side of her head. “You start 
worrying when it gets in here.”1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Law and power are closely connected. In a lawless society, power will 
reign supreme, while in a society of rule of law, power is reined in by the law. 
However, law also establishes and validates power. The dual face of law—
establishing and restraining power—is particularly relevant in unequal power 
relations, where the law both consolidates the power of strong parties and 
restricts their power by providing the weak parties with rights, in order to 
prevent them from being subjected to exercises of brute power. In this 
respect, inequality compensation is a key legal mechanism to regulate power 
relations. The law treats certain categories of people, including citizens, 
criminal suspects, employees, and consumers, as systematically weak parties 
relative to parties that are considered strong, such as the government, 
employers, and businesses. To balance these unequal power relationships 
weak parties are granted various rights in the domains of constitutional, 
administrative, labor, contract, and tort law. Examples include information 
rights, benefit-of-the-doubt and burden-of-proof rules, access to justice, and 
compensational rights. 
This classic account of inequality compensation in legal domains is 
challenged by technology. With the advent of computers, the Internet, 
genetic profiling, and other information-related technologies, power relations 
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start to shift. Since “knowledge is power,” as the adage holds, both strong 
and weak parties use information-related technologies to improve their 
respective information positions. For example, consumers can now use the 
Internet to search for the lowest prices and can use ratings websites to 
inform one another of their experiences with particular products and 
services. Such practices free the consumer from the monopoly power of the 
shop around the corner. However, the gain in power that technology has 
provided to consumers is paralleled by the gains that technology provides to 
businesses. For instance, technology enables e-businesses to gather more 
information about consumers—using cookies, web forms, and profiling 
techniques—than the classic brick-and-mortar shop. They can then use this 
information to target consumers with increasing sophistication. 
The gross outcome of such shifts in power relations is unclear: changes 
occur in different directions and sometimes along different dimensions. 
Parties may become stronger in one way, weaker in another, or both, 
depending on the circumstances. These shifts in power along different axes 
complicate the traditional ex ante model of inequality compensation which is 
based on the idea that certain parties are intrinsically stronger than others and 
must always be restrained by legal norms. 
This Article aims, first, to explore the technology-related shifts in power 
relations that are occurring in the domains of law enforcement, labor, and 
commerce. Second, it aims to identify and examine the consequences of 
these shifts for the legal protection of weak parties, particularly for existing 
mechanisms of inequality compensation in the associated legal domains. 
The domains of law enforcement, labor, and commerce exemplify 
unequal power relations and together cover a wide range of public and 
private law. Furthermore, technology is associated with significant shifts in 
the ways in which power is exercised today in these domains. Although the 
mechanism of inequality compensation will occur in most modern legal 
systems, the analysis is limited to the legal systems of the United States and 
the Netherlands and the concrete examples of legal protection that they 
supply.2 The Article will explore these countries, with their different common 
law and civil law traditions, in a roughly comparative approach to discover 
differences and commonalities in the compensation granted to weak parties 
for inequalities in power relations. 
 
 2. Where Dutch law is based on European Union (E.U.) law, I will focus on the E.U. 
law. I will also occasionally mention developments in U.K. law where these are illustrative, 
particularly in the area of criminal law. 
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After some preliminaries in Part II that further introduce the notions of 
power relations, inequality compensation, and technology, the Article 
examines the relationship between law enforcement and citizens in Part III, 
employers and employees in Part IV, and businesses and consumers in Part 
V. The analysis is grounded in case studies to illustrate the effect of 
information-related technologies on shifting power relations. These case 
studies form the basis for a more general discussion of shifts in the power 
relation and their consequences for legal protection of weak parties. Then, 
Part VI provides an integrated view of citizens, employees, and consumers 
and the way in which the different roles of individuals are becoming 
intertwined in the information society. This forms the basis for drawing 
some conclusions in Part VII, not only about the distinct areas of law for 
specific categories of people, but also about the overall legal protection of 
individuals in the information society. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
A. POWER RELATIONS 
Power is complex and multifaceted. The term “power” comprises a wide 
array of notions bearing Wittgensteinian family resemblances.3 It even comes 
close to being an “essentially contested concept,” that is, a concept “the 
proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper 
uses on the part of their users.”4 
For the purposes of this Article, the working definition of power is 
drawn from Dahl’s conceptualization of power relations: “A has power over 
B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
do.”5 This definition shows exactly why weak parties are given legal 
 
 3. The many notions of power are connected by a series of overlapping similarities, 
but no one feature is common to all. For an introduction into the concept of “family 
resemblances,” see generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
(P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd. 2009) (1953). 
 4. W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 169 
(1956); see also Eugene Garver, Rhetoric and Essentially Contested Arguments, 11 PHIL. & 
RHETORIC 156 (1978) (connecting Gallie’s essentially contested concepts to Aristotle’s 
account of rhetorical argument). For overviews of the many notions of power, see generally 
MARK HAUGAARD, POWER: A READER (2002) and JOHN SCOTT, POWER (2001). It is not 
possible to discuss the concept itself in this Article. Fortunately, there is no need to; since 
this Article looks at power relations from the perspective of legal protection of weak parties 
against strong parties, it suffices to provide a working definition that fits in this context. The 
Article, after all, aims to reflect on legal protection of weak parties rather than on power 
relations per se. 
 5. Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 202–03 (1957); Robert A. 
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protection in power relations. From the perspective of autonomy—a key 
value underlying modern Western legal systems—B should be able to decide 
without undue restrictions what she wants to do, and not merely because A 
makes her do so. 
This working definition can be enriched with some insights that refine 
Dahl’s conceptualization. Bachrach and Baratz have called attention to a 
second dimension of power by pointing out that power can be exercised 
indirectly and passively by limiting the scope of decision-making to exclude 
issues of relevance to B, for example, by (non-)agenda setting.6 Lukes has 
added a third dimension, namely, the bias in a system sustained “by the 
socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices 
of institutions.”7 Foucault has provided an important variation of Lukes’ 
third dimension with his insights into the power mechanism of surveillance 
architecture. This is famously illustrated by the Panopticon, a mechanism 
where watched people (prisoners) aware of the continuous gaze of the 
watcher (the prison guard) internalize the value and knowledge system of the 
watcher, disciplining themselves according to the dominant discourse in 
society.8 
This Article studies power relations in which A can get B to do 
something which B would not otherwise do, with a broad interpretation of 
“getting to do” that includes non-decision-making as well as cultural, 
institutional, and architectural mechanisms that have a disciplining effect on 
B. 
B. LEGAL PROTECTION: INEQUALITY COMPENSATION 
The legal phenomenon of inequality compensation that is embedded in 
the law is based on the idea that in society there are specific parties that have 
a structural, systematic advantage over other specific parties. This was a 
 
Dahl, Power, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (David L. Sills 
ed., 1968). 
 6. Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947, 
948 (1962). 
 7. See generally STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 26 (2005) (1974). Note, 
however, Haugaard’s critique, HAUGAARD, supra note 4, at 38–40, that Lukes’ stress on 
socially constituted bias makes it difficult to distinguish power from structural constraint. 
Haugaard suggests that an integrated theory of power and structure needs to be developed. 
Id. 
 8. For a critical discussion of panopticism, see generally David Lyon, THEORIZING 
SURVEILLANCE: THE PANOPTICON AND BEYOND (Devon Cullompton ed., 2006). See also 
MICHAEL FOUCAULT, POWER: ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT 1954–1984 (James D. 
Faubion ed., 2000); MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR: NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON 
(1975). 
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natural and valid assumption to make when the current systems were shaped 
during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. The relationship 
between law enforcement and citizens, between employers and employees, 
and between enterprises and consumers was by and large clear: the former 
could easily impose their will on the latter, unless something—such as legal 
norms—prevented or corrected them. 
It is an important function of the law to compensate for such structural 
inequalities. Criminal, consumer, and labor law have developed to regulate 
structural imbalances by protecting the weak party against abuse of power by 
the strong party. The protection takes the form of inequality compensation 
which imposes duties on strong parties and grants rights to weak parties. 
Examples include rights related to information provision, notification duties, 
supervision mechanisms, and access to justice. The legal system views 
citizens, employees, and consumers as intrinsically disadvantaged parties that 
require structural inequality compensation. These legal-protection rules are 
triggered by the mere fact of belonging to the class of the weak party at issue, 
irrespective of the specific manifestation of the power relation in concrete 
circumstances. 
C. TECHNOLOGY 
In a society as complex as the modern information and network society,9 
it may no longer be valid to assume that traditionally dominant parties remain 
more powerful than other parties. Partly through the influence of new 
technologies, most notably information and communication technology 
(ICT), but also genetic and surveillance technologies, unequal relationships 
seem to be shifting. This happens in subtle and often contradictory ways. 
Parties that were once considered weak by the very nature of the power 
relationship may emerge as the stronger party in certain circumstances. 
Alternatively, they can find themselves even weaker than they were before. 
Technology plays a significant role in these shifts. For instance, 
increasingly sophisticated technology enables criminals to protect their 
communications from police surveillance and store incriminating electronic 
evidence in a data haven abroad, outside the reach of mutual legal assistance. 
However, technology also facilitates criminal investigation by supplying 
unprecedented surveillance tools, such as, microscopic sensors, smart 
cameras, and keyboard sniffers (i.e., software that secretly records keystrokes 
and sends these to the police). In the field of commerce, e-businesses can 
collect much more data about customers using technology such as cookies 
 
 9. See generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (Blackwell, 
1996) (charting the social and economic relations of the global information economy). 
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and loyalty schemes. Consequently, these businesses are in a better position 
than ever to exploit their information advantage over the customer. At the 
same time, e-consumers can search the web for the lowest prices, participate 
in collective-buying activities, and set up grudge websites10 to force a 
company to change its policy. 
Admittedly, the role of technology in shifts in power relations is not 
always clear or easy to isolate from other factors. After all, power relations 
develop in social, economic, cultural, political, and architectural contexts. 
Technology is sometimes a sufficient cause for a certain development, 
sometimes a necessary cause, sometimes both, and at other times neither. 
Technological developments interact with other societal developments, in a 
process of mutual shaping where both developments influence each other.11 
This Article does not aim to determine the causal influence of technology 
on power relations as such; rather, it limits its inquiry to describing shifts in 
power relations in which technology plays some role. This includes 
circumstances where technology opens up new possibilities for a strong party 
to exercise power, where it creates new opportunities for weak parties to 
resist the power of a strong party, or even where it blurs the very distinction 
between a strong and a weak party. 
Because power relations hinge on knowledge and information12 it will be 
important to examine information technologies. However, while the case 
studies in this Article primarily involve ICT, technologies relating to genetic 
information have also contributed to technology-related shifts in power 
relations, particularly through the advent of DNA forensics. 
III. LAW ENFORCEMENT–CITIZEN 
This Part examines technology-related changes in the power relation of 
law enforcement and citizens, and assesses the consequences of these 
changes for the legal protection of citizens. The analysis begins with three 
case studies: DNA forensics, interception of telecommunications, and 
 
 10. See, e.g., Wakeup Walmart.com: America’s Campaign to Change Wal-Mart, 
http://www.wakeupwalmart.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2010). 
 11. For example, the introduction of mobile telephones has significantly changed the 
way people communicate. Specifically, mobile telephone users started using the SMS 
function of mobile telephones on a large scale and in ways completely unforeseen by its 
developers, thereby changing the technology. For a discussion of the mutual shaping of 
technology and society, see SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES IN 
SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law eds., 1992). 
 12. See FOUCAULT, POWER, supra note 8, at 133 (arguing that power hinges on the 
political, economic, and institutional regime of the production of truth). 
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Passenger Name Records. Based on these case studies, a general discussion 
follows, outlining major developments and showing that the government, in 
its role as the protector of law and order, has embraced the enormous 
increase in technology-enabled tracing capacity. This development has not 
been offset by counter-developments of citizen empowerment. The resulting 
shift in power relation involves two types of problems—citizens being 
wrongly involved in a government investigation and a potentially disciplining 
effect of surveillance architectures—which seem to require new forms of 
legal protection. 
A. CASE STUDY 1: DNA FORENSICS 
Since the invention of DNA fingerprinting in the 1980s, DNA forensics 
have contributed to a gradual expansion in investigation powers.13 Different 
types of DNA research have been developed and used in criminal 
investigation including DNA databasing, DNA phenotyping, mass screening, 
and familial searching. 
The rise of DNA databasing is most visible in England and Wales, where 
the U.K. database, National DNA Database (NDNAD), has expanded 
enormously over the past decade. In 2007, it contained up to four million 
profiles (around six percent of the population), which were gathered through 
routine sampling and profile retention from arrestees as well as victims, 
consenting witnesses, and volunteers.14 The U.S. national database, 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), was originally smaller in size, but 
outgrew the U.K. database in 2007, with 4.6 million profiles (around 1.5 
 
 13. See generally NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE FORENSIC USE OF 
BIOINFORMATION: ETHICAL ISSUES (2007) (examining the balance between police powers 
and individual rights to autonomy and privacy and offering recommendations to minimize 
misuses); MEREL M. PRINSEN, FORENSISCH DNA-ONDERZOEK: EEN BALANS TUSSEN 
OPSPORING EN FUNDAMENTELE RECHTEN (2008) (critically assessing Dutch and U.K. 
approaches to forensic DNA legislation); ROBIN WILLIAMS ET AL., GENETIC INFORMATION 
AND CRIME INVESTIGATION: SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF THE 
ESTABLISHMENT, EXPANSION AND POLICE USE OF THE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE (2004) 
(discussing the evolution in the use of genetic information in criminal investigations from 
case-by-case use to extensive and routine practice). 
 14. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 13, at 9. Note that the current 
English and Welsh practice of retaining profiles and samples from unconvicted offenders 
should be changed in light of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in S. and 
Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581; see HOME OFFICE, KEEPING THE RIGHT 
PEOPLE ON THE DNA DATABASE: SCIENCE AND PUBLIC PROTECTION (2009) (reporting on 
the government’s consultation process launched in May 2009). The proposed “change” 
comprises retention of profiles from unconvicted people for six years for less serious crimes 
or twelve years for serious crimes, which does not seriously alter the policy of storing data 
from non-criminal citizens. 
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percent of the population).15 In addition to CODIS, DNA databases exist in 
the United States at state and local levels, often containing more profiles. 
U.S. states are continually expanding their databases, allowing DNA samples 
to be taken from convicts and profiles to be stored for an increasing variety 
of crimes as well as for groups of citizens charged but not convicted.16 
In the Netherlands, the power to take a DNA sample from a suspect was 
introduced in 1994, and then expanded in 2001 to allow for DNA collection 
in more types of crime and without a magistrate’s warrant. In 2004, the DNA 
Convict Sampling Act allowed the Public Prosecutor to take samples from 
convicts in the interest of deterrence and to ensure more future matches with 
repeat offenders.17 The Dutch database is smaller than the U.K. and U.S. 
databases; nevertheless, since the 2004 Act it has exploded, growing from 
6,000 individual profiles in early 2005, to 45,000 in December 2007, to over 
99,000 (around 0.6 percent of the population) in May 2010.18 
As the use of DNA forensics has become more common, new qualitative 
methods of DNA analysis have also developed. For example, forensic DNA 
phenotyping, a relatively recent development, uses personal characteristics 
determined from crime scene DNA to trace unknown suspects.19 This can 
help limit the pool of possible suspects so that law enforcement officials can 
conduct a mass-screening investigation. Alternatively, it can help exclude 
certain groups of people from further investigation. In England and Wales, 
the Forensic Science Service can determine the rough geographical ancestry 
of the DNA sample donor,20 and at one time it offered a service to check for 
 
 15. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 13, at 9. 
 16. See generally Aaron P. Stevens, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA Databases 
in America, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 921 (2001) (describing the history of DNA databases and their 
expansion to include more classes of criminals); Bonnie L. Taylor, Storing DNA Samples of 
Non-Convicted Persons & the Debate over DNA Database Expansion, 20 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 509 
(2003) (arguing that the national trend of expanding DNA databases to include more 
unconvicted individuals violates the Fourth Amendment and privacy rights). 
 17. Wet DNA-onderzoek in strafzaken, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 
[Stb.] 596 (1993) (Neth.); Wet van 5 juli 2001 tot wijziging van de regeling van het DNA-
onderzoek in strafzaken, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 335 (2001) 
(Neth.); Wet DNA-onderzoek bij veroordeelden, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden [Stb.] 465 (2004) (Neth.). 
 18. DNA: Sporen Naar de Toekomst, http://www.dnasporen.nl (last visited July 1, 
2010). See also the comparison of U.K. and Dutch developments in PRINSEN, supra note 13. 
 19. For technical and regulatory discussions see Bert-Jaap Koops & Maurice 
Schellekens, Forensic DNA Phenotyping: Regulatory Issues, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 158 
(2008); Pilar N. Ossorio, About Face: Forensic Genetic Testing for Race and Visible Traits, 34 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 277 (2006). 
 20. This is contested, first because individuals’ DNA shows more variation than the 
variations of geographic groups of people, and second, because race is a social rather than a 
0973-1036 KOOPS WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2010 10:44 AM 
982 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:973 
 
red hair and light skin pigment.21 Determining geographical ancestry or 
ethnic background is becoming more popular as scientific knowledge about 
DNA evolves.22 As genetic knowledge advances, other phenotypical 
characteristics, such as hair, form, or height, may become available. In 
common law systems, such as those in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, use of a new technology is allowed until legislation or case law 
dictates otherwise.23 In contrast, in civil law systems, new investigation 
techniques can usually only be used when legislation specifically allows it. 
The Netherlands, for example, enacted a law allowing phenotyping for 
geographic ancestry and gender. Other features, such as hair color, however, 
must be designated by an Order in Council (i.e., a lower-order regulation 
based on the statute) before the police can derive them.24 
A third development is the use of DNA mass screening, or dragnet 
investigations, in which a group of people who match a suspect description 
are asked to voluntarily provide a DNA sample for profiling. This method 
was first used in the United States in 1990, when over 800 men in San Diego 
were tested in connection with a sextuple murder, and it has been used many 
times since.25 Dragnet investigations have raised constitutional concerns 
where the volunteers’ consent to DNA testing was given under police 
coercion. A paradigmatic example would be when a police officer gives an 
 
genetic concept. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 13, at 80–81. 
 21. FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, FACT SHEET: COMMONPLACE CHARACTERISTICS 
(2004), available at http://www.forensic.gov.uk. This service was discontinued due to 
insufficient demand from the police. For recent technological developments in deriving 
visible traits from crime-scene DNA, see Manfred Kayser & Peter M. Schneider, DNA-Based 
Prediction of Human Externally Visible Characteristics in Forensics: Motivations, Scientific Challenges, 
and Ethical Considerations, 3 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 154 (2009); Fan Liu et al., Eye 
Color and the Prediction of Complex Phenotypes from Genotypes, 19 CURRENT BIOLOGY 192 (2009). 
 22. See Mark D. Schriver & Rick A. Kittles, Genetic Ancestry and the Search for Personalized 
Genetic Histories, 5 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 611 (2004). 
 23. See Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 791–92 (1999); Koops & Schellekens, supra note 19, at 27–32. 
In the United States, only Indiana, Rhode Island, and Wyoming have outlawed forensic 
phenotyping. See IND. CODE ANN. § 10-13-6-16 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.5-10 
(2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-404 (2007). 
 24. Wet van 8 mei 2003 tot wijziging van de regeling van het DNA-onderzoek in 
strafzaken in verband met het vaststellen van uiterlijk waarneembare persoonskenmerken uit 
celmateriaal [Act of May 8, 2003], Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 201 
(2003) (Neth.). 
 25. Philip P. Pan, Pr. George’s Chief Has Used Serial Testing Before; Farrell Oversaw DNA 
Sampling of 2,300 in Fla., WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1998, at B1 (“One of the first agencies to 
experiment with the [DNA dragnet] was the San Diego police department, which tested 
about 800 men during its search for a serial killer who stabbed six women to death in their 
homes between January and September 1990.”). 
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individual the “choice” between providing a sample voluntarily or being 
subjected to a court order for DNA testing and enduring the publicity that 
such an order would generate.26 
The Netherlands has also used DNA mass screenings in a score of cases, 
starting with the 1999 testing of 115 men in the still unsolved case of a serial 
rapist in Utrecht.27 Between 1999 and 2004, approximately 4,600 people were 
asked to volunteer a DNA sample in fourteen cases.28 The Dutch practice 
has to conform to policy criteria—provided by the Minister of Justice—that 
favor restricted use. These are generally reserved for the most serious crimes 
that cause significant social unrest,29 and must be made with authorization 
from the Board of Procurators-General, the highest body within the Public 
Prosecutor. In 2007, the policy was expanded. Mass screening is no longer a 
tool of last resort, but rather part of the reasonable effort extolled by law 
enforcement during investigations.30 
The fourth, and final recent innovation in DNA forensics is familial 
searching. This involves searching a database for partial matches of DNA 
profiles that suggest that the unknown person who left the stain at the crime 
scene is closely related to a known person whose DNA is stored in the DNA 
database. Familial searching was first used in England in 2002 in solving a 
1973 double homicide case.31 The crime scene stains had been profiled with 
Low Copy Number analysis, a new technique so sensitive that it can yield a 
DNA profile from only a few body cells, and yielded a partial match with a 
profile in the database.32 Ultimately the father of the partial match, then 
deceased, was identified as the perpetrator.33 
 
 26. See Sepideh Esmaili, Searching for a Needle in a Haystack: The Constitutionality of Police 
DNA Dragnets, 82 CHI. KENT L. REV. 495 (2007). 
 27. CHRISTIANNE J. DE POOT & EDWIN W. KRUISBERGEN, KRINGEN ROND DE 
DADER GROOTSCHALIG DNA-ONDERZOEK ALS INSTRUMENT IN DE OPSPORING [CIRCLES 
AROUND THE PERPETRATOR: LARGE-SCALE DNA-ANALYSIS AS A TOOL IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION] 33 (2006). 
 28. Id. at 203. 
 29. Kamerstukken II, 2000-2001, 27 400 VI, No. 49 (Neth.). 
 30. Kamerstukken II, 2007-2008, 34 415, No. 1 (Neth.). 
 31. Robin Williams & Paul Johnson, Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and Intrusiveness: Issues in the 
Developing Uses of DNA Profiling in Support of Criminal Investigations, 33 J.L. MED. ETHICS 545, 
554 (2005); Robin McKie, Did a Killer Evade Justice Due to Withheld Evidence? The Collapse of the 
Case Against Angus Sinclair was a Bitter Blow to a Scientist Whose DNA work was not Fully Presented 
in Court, THE OBSERVER, Sept. 16, 2007, at 17. 
 32. Williams & Johnson, supra note 31, at 554. 
 33. Id. In the Netherlands, familial searching requires a statutory basis which does not 
yet exist, but which has been proposed by the government. Kamerstukken II, 2007-08, 
34 415, No. 1 (Neth.); see also Merel M. Prinsen, DNA-verwantschapsonderzoek. Familie van de 
verdachte?, 6 STRAFBLAD 242 (2008) (discussing pros and cons of familial searching in the 
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Familial searching provides an interesting expansion of policing, since it 
“effectively increases police scrutiny and interest in people based on their 
relatives’ past involvement with the criminal justice system.”34 This practice 
raises three main concerns. First, it could have “differential effects on groups 
in American society.”35 Second, it raises questions about whether the consent 
given by volunteers in a mass screening is truly informed. That is, are 
volunteers sufficiently informed that permitting their DNA to be included in 
a forensic database can also affect their relatives? Finally, familial searching 
unearths ethical concerns in situations where individuals are not aware that 
their social family is not their biological family, for example, when the 
assumed father turns out not to be the biological father.36 
B. CASE STUDY 2: INTERCEPTION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Over the past decades, interception of communications has expanded 
greatly in the United States and, particularly, in the Netherlands. In the 
United States, interception of phone (wire) communications was regulated37 
after Katz interpreted the Fourth Amendment to protect telephone 
communications.38 In 1986, the Electronic Communications and Privacy Act 
(ECPA) enabled the interception of electronic communications under less 
strict conditions than those that govern wire interception.39 ECPA also 
allowed wiretapping for more types of crimes and introduced “roving” 
interception, which involves following the targeted suspect rather than 
focusing on fixed phone lines or places.40 The USA Patriot Act of 2001 
allowed interception for even more crimes, and it transferred voice mail from 
 
Dutch context). 
 34. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases To Catch 
Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 255 (2006). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Williams & Johnson, supra note 31, at 554–56 (assessing the effects of the recent 
innovative use of DNA databasing for “familial searching” and the way it has unsettled 
agreed understandings about appropriate uses of DNA). See generally Erica Haimes, Social and 
Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in Forensic Investigations: Insights from Family and 
Kinship Studies, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 263 (2006) (exploring the socio-ethical concerns 
raised by familial searching of forensic databases in criminal investigations). 
 37. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). 
 38. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“The Government’s activities 
in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon 
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and 
seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 39. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006)). 
 40. Id. 
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the wiretap regime to the less protected communications storage regime.41 
The Netherlands experienced similar expansion.42 Particularly significant was 
the Special Investigation Powers Act of 2000 that broadened the scope of 
police powers to allow interception of the connection not only of suspects, 
but also of non-suspects, provided that such interception could benefit the 
investigation.43 
While the law in the books broadened over time, an equally important 
expansion of interception powers occurred in practice. In the United States, 
the number of interception authorizations (for criminal investigation, not for 
intelligence or national security) tripled since 1987 (from 673 authorizations 
in 1987 to 1,891 in 2008), and the average number of intercepted 
communications in each case doubled (from 1,299 communications in 1987 
to 2,707 in 2008), so that the total amount of communications intercepted 
sextupled.44 In the Netherlands, the available figures are much higher: in 
1993, 3,619 interception authorizations were granted for criminal 
investigation (more, in absolute terms, than in the United States),45 rising to 
10,000 in 1999, and 26,425 authorizations in 2008.46 This does not mean that 
over a decade, ten times more people have been under wiretap. 
Authorizations are given for separate connections, such as fixed and mobile 
phones, and criminals today have substantially more phones; nevertheless, 
the trend is undeniably upwards. Furthermore, given the enormous increase 
 
 41. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Interrupt and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 42. See generally ARNO HUBERTUS HENRICUS SMITS, STRAFVORDERLIJK ONDERZOEK 
VAN TELECOMMUNICATIE (2006) (surveying the historical development of Dutch law in the 
area of criminal investigation of telecommunications). 
 43. See WETBOEK VAN STRAFVORDERING [CRIM. PROC. CODE] art. 126n, 126u, 
introduced by the Wet bijzondere opsporingsbevoegdheden [Special Investigatory Powers 
Act], Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] (1999) 245 (Neth.). 
 44. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 WIRETAP REPORT 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap08/contents.html [hereinafter 2008 WIRETAP REPORT]; 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1997 WIRETAP REPORT 30 (1999), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap/contents.html. Note, however, a slight decrease in recent 
years: the 2007 numbers were higher, with 2,208 authorizations and 3,106 intercepts on 
average. 2008 WIRETAP REPORT, supra, at 32. 
 45. Wiretapping for intelligence versus criminal investigation purposes may yield a 
quite different picture, although it is difficult to compare these due to the official secrecy 
associated with intelligence practice. 
 46. The 1993 figure is from Z. REIJNE, TAPPEN IN NEDERLAND (1996). The 2000 
figure is mentioned in Grootschalig afluisteren van moderne telecommunicatiesystemen, 
Kamerstukken II, 2000-2001, 27 591, No. 2. The 2008 figure is given in Kamerstukken II, 
2009-2010, 30 517, No. 13 (Neth.)—the first annual systematic Dutch wiretap figures to be 
officially published. 
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in communications generally, particularly since the advent of mobile phones 
with short message service (SMS) capability and the Internet, much more 
data have become available to the police through intercepts. This is not only 
a quantitative increase, but also a qualitative increase. New types of data, such 
as internet browsing and location data, now allow long distance glimpses of 
human life that were previously hidden to the police, or observable only with 
significant effort and costs. 
Another development has occurred in interception: the introduction of 
mandatory interceptability. Until the early 1990s telephone communications 
were easily interceptable. Then, because of an increase in market parties and 
diversification of telecom technologies, the police began to encounter 
difficulty intercepting. Concerned that a major investigation tool might be 
lost, governments passed laws forcing telecommunication providers to build 
in interceptability. The U.S. Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 199447 and Chapter 13 of the Dutch 
Telecommunications Act of 1998 imposed obligations on 
telecommunications carriers to ensure interceptability.48 A statement by 
Dutch Member of Parliament highlights the reasoning behind these laws: 
“The traditional form of telephony can be intercepted. An alternative must 
be the same. We find that being interceptable is an inseparable part of the 
phenomenon of telephony in our country.”49 
 
 47. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1008(b)(1) 
(2006); see also AskCALEA: Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 
http://www.askcalea.net (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (acting as a resource and information 
clearinghouse for individuals and organizations with an interest in the Communications 
Assistance for Legal Enforcement Act of 1994). 
 48. Telecommunicatiewet [Telecommunications Act], Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk 
der Nederlanden [Stb.] 610 (1998) (Neth.); see also Council Resolution 96/C329/01, 1996 
O.J. (C 329) 1 (EC) (addressing the lawful interception of telecommunications). For a 
comparison of the U.S. and Dutch legislation, which shows a more liberal approach to 
impositions on market parties in the United States, see Bert-Jaap Koops & Rudi Bekkers, 
Interceptability of Telecommunications: Is US and Dutch Law Prepared for the Future?, 31 TELECOMM. 
POL’Y 45 (2007). This analysis shows that the U.S. approach, as laid down in CALEA, is 
essentially more flexible and balanced than the Dutch approach. CALEA already presumes 
some form of trade-off, through the crucial provision of 47 USC § 1008(b)(1), which lists 
ten factors to be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of requiring a 
particular telecom provider to build in interceptability, is flanked by several other checks and 
balances that ensure enhanced cost-effectiveness. The authors conclude that the rigid Dutch 
law cannot handle such a trade-off since it requires tout court that new telecommunications 
networks and services are made interceptable and that the providers fund these measures, 
regardless of the costs or the effects on security, privacy, or innovation. 
 49. Handelingen II, Oct. 25, 1995, 17-1123 (Neth.) (translation by Bert-Jaap Koops, 
emphasis added). In a related development, when technologists discovered that cell 
telephones were capable of “knowing” their location, governments started to mandate that 
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C. CASE STUDY 3: PASSENGER NAME RECORDS50 
Apart from developments in regular criminal investigation discussed in 
the previous case studies, anti-terrorism developments in the periphery of 
criminal law also merit attention. In this area, the mandatory exchange 
between countries of Passenger Name Records (PNR) of air travelers 
constitutes an interesting case study. PNR include information such as a 
passenger’s name and address, birth date, passport details, payment data, 
emergency contacts, and meal and seating preferences. After the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., in 2001, the United 
States believed that processing PNR might help to keep terrorists out of the 
country. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) started asking 
airlines to provide the government with access to their PNR records. For 
European airlines, this processing of personal data for purposes other than 
the original purposes for which the data were collected violated data 
protection legislation if conducted without a legal ground. Consequently, the 
European Union (E.U.) made an agreement with the United States to 
authorize the provision of PNR.51 The agreement did not authorize the 
exchange of PNR data, but only the one-way access of U.S. government 
agencies to European data. 
The PNR agreement, however, was controversial. The European 
Parliament felt that it had been outmaneuvered as protector of the privacy of 
European citizens and challenged the underlying documents52 before the 
European Court of Justice. The Court struck down the Commission’s and 
Council’s decisions, finding that they were based on the wrong legal ground, 
and thereby effectively annulled the PNR agreement.53 However, the 
 
mobile phones be made with the ability to make their location known in case an emergency 
number was called. See generally David J. Phillips, Privacy and Data Protection in the Workplace: 
The US Case, in REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY? 39 (Sjaak Nouwt et al. eds., 
2005) (concluding that although the impetus for these mandates was not crime-control but 
safety concerns, as a result locatability has become an inherent feature of mobile phones, and 
as a consequence, generated location data will routinely be available for criminal 
investigation purposes). 
 50. This Section builds on Vagelis Papakonstantinou & Paul De Hert, The PNR 
Agreement and Transatlantic Anti-Terrorism Co-Operation: No Firm Human Rights Framework on 
Either Side of the Atlantic, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 885 (2009). 
 51. On the European side, the agreement was backed up by two official documents: 
Commission Decision 2004/535, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11 (EC), and Council Decision 
2004/496, 2004 O.J. (L 183) 83 (EC). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Joined Cases C-317/04 & 318/04, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-04721 
(holding that the Agreement had been passed as a measure in the area of justice and home 
affairs (where the European Commission and European Council take decisions), while it 
should have been passed as a measure related to economic, social, and environmental 
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European Parliament’s action backfired, by triggering a renegotiation with 
the United States on a second PNR agreement, in which the United States 
emerged even stronger. 
The second PNR agreement was concluded on June 29, 2007 and 
memorialized in three documents.54 It comprises fewer passenger records 
than the first agreement—nineteen instead of thirty four—but since the 
records contain the same types of information, only in a different format, 
this was only a cosmetic reduction. The records can be retained significantly 
longer than before—fifteen instead of three and a half years—and it is not 
guaranteed that the records will be destroyed after this period.55 Moreover, a 
wider range of U.S. agencies, not only customs, can access the data, and the 
data may be transferred to other countries at the discretion of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).56 
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, although the PNR 
Agreements were initiated in the post 9/11 wave of anti-terrorism measures, 
the PNR data may be used by the U.S. government for combating or 
preventing not only terrorism, but also 
other serious crimes, including organized crime, that are 
transnational in nature. PNR may be used where necessary for the 
protection of the vital interests of the data subject or other persons, 
or in any criminal judicial proceedings, or as otherwise required by 
law. DHS will advise the EU regarding the passage of any U.S. 
legislation which materially affects the statements made in this 
letter.57 
In other words, personal data of European citizens collected to facilitate 
air travel accommodations are now mandatorily provided to the U.S. 
government in the interest of counter-terrorism, and can simultaneously be 
 
policies (where the European Parliament has co-decision power alongside the Commission 
and Council)). 
 54. The three documents are (1) an agreement signed by both parties, (2) a U.S. letter 
to the E.U. assuring how it will handle European PNR data in the future, and (3) a letter 
from the E.U. to the United States acknowledging receipt of this letter. See Council Decision 
2007/551/CFSP/JHA, 2007 O.J. (L 204) 16 (EU). The relationship between the three 
documents makes the agreement uncertain, thereby complicating the assessment of its exact 
legal status and contents. See Papakonstantinou & De Hert, supra note 50, at 908–19. 
 55. Papakonstantinou & De Hert, supra note 50, at 912 (citing Ch.VII, U.S. Letter to 
the European Union in Council Decision 2007/551, 2007 O.J. (L 204) 16–25 (EC)) (“We 
expect that EU PNR data shall be deleted at the end of this period; questions of whether and 
when to destroy PNR data collected in accordance with this letter will be addressed by DHS 
and the EU as part of future discussions.”). 
 56. Id. at 911. 
 57. Id.  
0973-1036 KOOPS WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2010 10:44 AM 
2010] SHIFTING POWER RELATIONS 989 
 
used for combating serious crime, protecting vital interests, or any other 
purposes currently or later stipulated by U.S. law. “Function creep” seems a 
bland description of this deviation from the principle of purpose 
specification and use limitation that is ingrained in European data protection 
law.58 The rapid expansion of PNR functionality seems better captured by 
the term “function rush.” 
The developments in PNR are not solely products of U.S. political 
pressure. Several E.U. countries have also started to require access to PNR 
and store these data for anti-terrorism or other purposes, and a Framework 
Decision is being proposed to introduce PNR processing throughout the 
E.U.59 Interestingly, air carriers already must communicate Advance 
Passenger Information (API) to authorities of E.U. Member States for 
fighting illegal immigration;60 “[t]he added value of PNR is that it helps 
identify unknown people and develop risk indicators.”61 Some member 
states, including the United Kingdom, would like to see the purpose of PNR 
processing extended from fighting terrorism and organized crime to other 
purposes as well.62 
D. DISCUSSION 
Broad use of DNA forensics and interception of communications is 
representative of a wide range of advances in criminal investigation using 
new technologies or new applications of existing technologies. The means 
for searching computers, collecting traffic data, ordering the production of 
computer data, employing camera and olfactory surveillance,63 and utilizing 
forensic chemistry have developed significantly over the past two decades.64 
 
 58. See Directive 95/46/EC, art. 6(1)(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 59. Press Release, European Commission, Proposal for a COUNCIL FRAMEWORK 
DECISION on the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for Law Enforcement Purposes, 
Memo/07/449 (Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?-
reference=MEMO/07/449&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
 60. Directive 2004/82/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 261) 24 (EU). 
 61. Press Release, European Commission, supra note 59. 
 62. See SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, THE PASSENGER NAME RECORD 
(PNR) FRAMEWORK DECISION: THE GOVERNMENT REPLY TO THE FIFTEENTH REPORT 
FROM THE HOUSE OF LORDS EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE SESSION 2007-08 HL PAPER 
106, 1–2 (2008) (recommending that PNR be extended to “serious crimes”). 
 63. Olfactory surveillance is conducted by detecting scents, for example, with sniffer 
dogs or wasps to detect drugs or chemicals. See Amber Marks, Drug Detection Dogs and the 
Growth of Olfactory Surveillance: Beyond the Rule of Law?, 4 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 257 (2007) 
(discussing the expansion of olfactory surveillance in the United Kingdom through increased 
use of drug detection dogs and arguing that it sets a dangerous precedent for the regulation 
of other surveillance technologies). 
 64. See KRISTIE BALL ET AL., A REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: FOR THE 
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The PNR case study, moreover, is emblematic of government anti-terrorism 
measures and efforts in the fringes of crime-fighting. This includes a host of 
administrative or pseudo-criminal measures—incorporating biometrics in 
travel documents, increased identification duties, preventative frisking, and 
scanning of laptops at customs—taken to scan and store data about groups 
of people to prevent potentially dangerous activities. 
Evident in these case studies is a consistent pattern of increasing traces. 
Citizens leave digital traces when exploring the Internet, using automatic 
teller machines (ATMs) and point-of-sale terminals, entering secured 
buildings, walking the streets under the watchful eyes of closed circuit 
television (CCTV); they leave physical traces when walking around, touching 
objects, smoking cigarettes, combing their hair, or drinking beer—all of 
which leaves behind enough body cells to enable DNA profiling.65 Not all of 
these traces are new. Fingerprints, for example, have long been available for 
government scrutiny. But many traces have only come into existence through 
the advent of ICT, while others can only be considered as traces because 
technological developments have enabled their identification as such. The 
increase in traces is enormous when we compare the digital and physical 
footprint of today’s citizens with the footprint of citizens two decades ago, 
both in quantity and in quality. 
Moreover, network technologies and digitization have enabled 
connecting these traces in many ways, effectively making citizens into digital 
persons66 living their lives in databases.67 The interconnection of traces can 
 
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER BY THE SURVEILLANCE STUDIES NETWORK (David M. 
Wood ed., 2006), available at http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/-
data_protection/practical_application/surveillance_society_full_report_2006.pdf; Ben 
Bowling et al., Crime Control Technologies: Towards an Analytical Framework and Research Agenda, in 
REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES 51 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008); JAMES 
C. FRASER & ROBIN WILLIAMS, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE (2009); Bert-Jaap 
Koops, Technology and the Crime Society: Rethinking Legal Protection, 1 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 
93 (2009). 
 65. Current DNA profiling requires only some dozens of picograms (i.e., 10-12 or a 
millionth of a millionth of a gram) of body material, the equivalent of four or five body cells, 
to make a DNA profile, provided the material is not contaminated. DNA profiles can 
therefore be made from material collected from single strands of hair, toothbrushes, 
cigarette butts, or smudges on a glass. See Peter Gill & Tim Clayton, The current status of DNA 
profiling in the UK, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 29, 49 (Jim Fraser & Robin Williams 
eds., 2009). 
 66. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004) (arguing that the existing privacy regulatory 
regime is uneven, overly complex, and ineffective at addressing the expansion in data 
compilation and retention on individuals). 
 67. See generally SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN 
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also yield surprising results hitherto unimaginable, as illustrated by the 
development of DNA familial searching and digital profiling,68 in which 
information about citizens is created using only data from other persons. 
Within the power relations of law enforcement and citizens, the 
enormous increase in tracing capacity enabled by technology has been 
liberally embraced by the government in its role as law and order protector. 
Surfing the wave of the post-9/11 climate of fear,69 as well as the more 
general and somewhat older wave of the risk society (i.e., a society that 
frames problems in terms of risks and that deals with hazards through 
systematic risk assessment and risk management),70 the U.S. government has 
significantly broadened its surveillance powers over the past two decades. 
This has enabled the United States to surveil all citizens, in the dual sense of 
sur-veiller (i.e., “watching over”): care and control.71 It has eagerly accepted the 
possibilities of the ever-increasing availability of personal data stored in 
existing databases, which are accessible to police and intelligence agencies 
through liberal data-ordering powers. It has also started to mandate the 
storage of personal data that would otherwise be deleted.72 Furthermore, it 
has created extensive databases itself, such as DNA and PNR databases, 
which store data not about suspects of concrete crimes, but of varying 
collections of citizens who are, in varying degrees, seen as potential 
perpetrators of crime or terrorism. Technology is thus facilitating what is 
effectively a paradigm shift in the government’s role in combating crime 
 
THE 21ST CENTURY (2000) (discussing how advances in technologies endanger personal 
privacy). 
 68. See generally Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling and the Identity of the European Citizen, in 
PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 303 (Mireille 
Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008) (describing how the proliferation of automatically 
generated profiles in an increasingly networked society can affect the lives of ordinary 
citizens). 
 69. Cf. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007) 
(arguing that governing through crime fuels a culture of fear and control that in turn lowers 
the threshold of fear); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE (2005) (discussing problems in individual and social judgments that can make 
people more fearful than is warranted). 
 70. See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (1992) 
(arguing that in a risk society, the “logic” of risk production outweighs the “logic” of wealth 
production). 
 71. DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE 3 (2001). 
 72. Most notable is the mandatory retention of telecommunications traffic data in 
Europe. See Directive 2006/24/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54 (EU). 
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from an ex post, incidental, and last resort type of criminal law to an ex ante, 
comprehensive, and first resort type of criminal law.73 
Now, how exactly does this affect the power relation of law enforcement 
and citizen? Law enforcement has acquired and is exercising considerably 
more power over ordinary citizens. The most poignant way the government 
can get a citizen to do what he would not otherwise do—by incarcerating 
him—has gained considerable momentum in the climate of “penal 
harshness” that has accompanied the risk society, particularly in the United 
States, but also in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, a country that 
was once renowned for its mild and humane penal approach.74 The expanded 
footprint of substantive law, constituted by the rise of regulatory crimes75 and 
the criminalization of banal offenses or antisocial behavior,76 implies that the 
punishing power of government is now exercised against wider circles of 
citizens. 
However, what is more important for our analysis is that power is being 
exercised in new ways, beyond simply imprisoning or fining people. This is 
the architectural component of the surveillance society. Society’s information 
processes are being structured in such a way as to enable continuous scrutiny 
of citizens for early warnings of abnormal and potentially dangerous 
behavior. As soon as the system gives off warning signals, restraint is 
exercised in ways more subtle than mere physical incapacitation, for example, 
by tracking rather than confining potentially dangerous subjects.77 
 
 73. Koops, supra note 64, at 117 (arguing that criminal law is shifting from a last resort 
to a primary tool of social control). 
 74. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL 
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001) (arguing that changes in criminal justice in the 
United States and the United Kingdom in the last twenty-five years are attributable to the 
social organization of modernity and the neoconservative politics that dominated in the 
1980s); NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008) (discussing how British criminal 
justice policy has become increasingly politicized); Michael Tonry & Catrien Bijleveld, Crime, 
Criminal Justice, and Criminology in the Netherlands, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 1 (Michael Tonry & Catrien Bijleveld eds., 2007) (surveying the Dutch 
criminal justice system). 
 75. See generally Andrew Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?, 116 L. Q. REV. 225 
(2000) (critically examining the expansion of criminal offenses to gain political favor); Robert 
Baldwin, The New Punitive Regulation, 67 MOD. L. REV. 351 (2004) (discussing evidence of a 
drift towards punitive approaches to regulation and more frequent imposition of criminal 
sanctions). 
 76. See generally Stuart Macdonald, A Suicidal Woman, Roaming Pigs and a Noisy 
Trampolinist: Refining the ASBO’s Definition of ‘Anti-Social Behaviour,’ 69 MOD. L. REV. 183 
(2006) (discussing the definition of antisocial behavior employed by the Crime and Disorder 
Act of 1998 for the purposes of the Anti-Social Behaviour Order). 
 77. See Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008) (arguing that legal 
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Foucault’s recollection of Bentham’s Panopticon as a paradigmatic way 
of disciplining people truly seems visionary: digital citizens in today’s 
database nation cannot help but be aware of the watchful eye of the 
government’s guards. It is not the fact of being watched, but the fact that at 
any moment they can be watched, that has a potentially disciplining effect on 
citizens. Perhaps it is this as much as any other factor that triggers the 
ubiquitous “I have nothing to hide” response78: a psychological mechanism 
of citizens to rationalize and therewith get to grips with the government’s 
panoptic gaze. The implicit implication of “I have nothing to hide” is that “I 
don’t mind being watched because I’m doing nothing wrong,” and this 
precisely constitutes the normalizing, disciplining effect that Foucault’s 
analysis of power elucidates. Through the panoptic power of surveillance 
architecture, citizens embrace society’s prevalent paradigm of normality. This 
is not in itself good or bad, but it is an exercise of power in the relationship 
between government and citizen that must not be overlooked. 
 The increase in government power through the enlarged footprint of 
criminal law and the establishment of surveillance architectures is not offset 
by counter-developments that empower citizens. It is obvious that 
technology also opens up new paths for citizens, but these lie in the sphere 
of participatory democracy and electronic service delivery, and they do not 
generally affect the power relation of citizens with law enforcement. 
Technology does offer some options to citizens for shielding information, 
potentially more securely than is possible physically (e.g., with strong 
cryptography). However, on balance, technology facilitates the investigative 
ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies much more than it 
enhances citizens’ ability to evade authorities.79 Simple privacy enhancing 
technologies (PETs) like drawing the curtains or whispering used to be quite 
effective against peeping Toms or eavesdroppers, but they are insufficient 
against modern home and body monitoring devices.80 Furthermore, PETs for 
digital security are usually more complex and difficult to use than physical 
security devices. To be sure, some groups—organized and calculating 
criminals and terrorists—do benefit from technologies that allow them to 
 
scrutiny of targeted forms of non-physical control has been overlooked). 
 78. Cf. Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007) (critically examining the argument that no privacy 
problem exists if a person has nothing to hide). 
 79. Koops, supra note 64, at 101. 
 80. See generally Bert-Jaap Koops & Merel M. Prinsen, Houses of Glass, Transparent Bodies: 
How New Technologies Affect Inviolability of the Home and Bodily Integrity in the Dutch Constitution, 16 
INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 177, 180 (2007) (discussing how technological developments in 
ICT and DNA research pose a threat to home and bodily integrity). 
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hide from government scrutiny, and it is these groups that the new 
surveillance measures aim to combat. But compared to the traditional 
application of criminal law, the new measures are much less targeted and 
narrowly tailored. Thus, they are more likely to affect all citizens rather than 
small groups of suspects or would-be terrorists. In the arms race between 
governments and organized crime and terrorist groups, however legitimate 
and necessary it might be, ordinary citizens suffer massive collateral damage. 
This collateral damage has two faces, each of which seems to require new 
forms of legal protection if a reasonable balance of power is to be maintained 
between government and citizens. First, citizens risk being wrongly involved 
in a government investigation. Some errors will always happen, because of 
human or technical imperfections, or due to the fact that profiling always 
involves some false positives, i.e., people who happen to fit a certain profile 
when in fact they do not belong to the category of people the profile aims at 
identifying. Errors may also occur because of criminal identity theft, which is 
a serious problem in both the United States and the Netherlands.81 The risk 
of errors in crime fighting is not new, but the magnitude of the risk has 
grown with the rise of penal harshness and the expansion of surveillance 
databases. More importantly, it also involves other types of risk: the potential 
harm for citizens is not so much incarceration or even severe physical or 
emotional damage to home, body, or close relationships, rather it involves 
vague, invisible, and long-term forms of harm resulting from “data shadows” 
lingering in public and private databases. Perhaps the core vulnerability is no 
longer sending an innocent person to jail, but labeling the digital persona of 
an innocent citizen with a stamp that significantly lowers the quality of her 
future social life. Besides safeguards for proportional investigation and a fair 
 
 81. For the United States, see Michael W. Perl, It’s Not Always About the Money: Why the 
State Identity Theft Laws Fail to Adequately Address Criminal Record Identity Theft, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 169 (2003) (discussing the inadequacy of state identity theft laws to protect 
against criminal record identity theft in which an identity thief obtains a victim’s personal 
information then commits crimes while acting as the victim). For the Netherlands, note the 
case of Mr. K, who was registered in government databases for over thirteen years as a 
serious drug criminal as the result of identity theft by a drug addict. Mr. K suffers significant 
obstacles in daily life; he is frequently held up at Schiphol Airport, receives numerous tickets 
for dodging transport fares, has had difficulty obtaining a mortgage, and has been subjected 
to a search in his home by thirty-five armed investigation officers, which induced him to 
move because all of his neighbors shunned him. The National Ombudsman castigated the 
government for their consistent failure to remove the man’s registration data from its 
databases. See DUTCH NATIONAL OMBUDSMAN REPORT 2008/232 (2008), available at 
http://www.ombudsman.nl/nieuws/persberichten/2008/documents/Rapport200802-
32.pdf. 
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trial, new protection mechanisms should be introduced in the form of 
structural organized distrust within the neo-criminal justice system itself.82 
The second face of the collateral damage to citizens is the disciplining 
effect of surveillance architectures. New forms of restraint, more subtle and 
varied than physical imprisonment, are imposed on groups encompassing 
more than just sophisticated criminals and terrorists. For example, ethnic 
minorities may be disproportionately stopped, frisked, and asked for 
identification in public spaces; antisocial people may be forced to comply 
with conditions of “Anti-Social Behaviour Orders”;83 and perpetrators of 
sexual offenses may be required to register for life in a sexual offender 
registry with community notification,84 to name but a few affected groups.85 
Legal protection for these new forms of restraint is significantly 
underdeveloped.86 This is eloquently illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
statement that “a statute that requires people to report for the rest of their 
lives to the government each time that they change hair color does not even 
invoke any constitutional scrutiny.”87 Moreover, citizens who are not directly 
restrained because they happen not to belong to a hapless category of 
“abnormal” people, are nevertheless affected by the government’s panoptic 
power and may discipline themselves to conform to the prevalent paradigm 
of normality. Should this shift in the power relation between government and 
citizen not also be balanced by some new form of legal protection? This 
 
 82. Koops, supra note 64. 
 83. Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) allow authorities in the United Kingdom to 
impose an injunction on someone to refrain from further “antisocial” behavior, a breach of 
which is a criminal offense. See Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37 (Eng.); see also 
Macdonald, supra note 76 (arguing that ASBOs should be limited to repeat criminal 
offenders). 
 84. Cf. Jill S. Levenson & David A. D’Amora, Social Policies Designed to Prevent Sexual 
Violence: The Emperor’s New Clothes?, 18 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 168 (2007) (arguing that sex 
offender registration and notification laws have not achieved their goals). Note that certain 
non-sexual offenders also end up in sexual offender registries. See Ofer Raban, Be They Fish or 
Not Fish: The Fishy Registration of Nonsexual Offenders, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 499 
(2007) (“[A] textbook example of negligent policymaking supported by faulty data and 
upheld by often poor judicial reasoning.”). 
 85. Cf. DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 40 (2007) (“Controls 
are sought especially against ‘undeserving’ claimants and ‘dangerous’ offenders—and, even 
more, ‘terrorists’—with the result that it is the poor and the marginal who are most deeply 
affected.”). 
 86. See Murphy, supra note 77 (arguing that technologies of restraint are imposed 
without necessary procedural safeguards). 
 87. Id. at 191 (referring to an earlier discussion of Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. 
Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), addressing Connecticut’s “Megan’s Law” that establishes a publicly 
available on-line sex-offender registry with photographs showing, among other things, the 
offender’s hair color). 
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question will be revisited after first examining how other power relations are 
shifting. 
IV. EMPLOYER–EMPLOYEE88 
This Part examines technology-related changes in the power relation of 
employers and employees, and assesses the consequences of these changes 
for the legal protection of employees. While advances in ICT in recent years 
have lifted workplace constraints for many employees, these advances have 
also subjected workers to increased scrutiny. The following two case 
studies—workplace monitoring and location monitoring—suggest that the 
limits of employer surveillance will have to be renegotiated. It is 
questionable, however, whether current legal-protection mechanisms, which 
are largely based on transparency and consent, will suffice to empower 
employees to engage in renegotiation. 
A. CASE STUDY 1: WORKPLACE MONITORING 
The workplace has changed drastically with the introduction of ICT. 
Contrary to early fears—or hopes—that many workers would become 
redundant through the automation of office tasks, ICT has not led to the 
replacement of workers, but rather to significant changes in the nature and 
organization of work processes. The advent of the Internet, in particular, and 
the attendant introduction of e-mail as a standard tool for communication 
have changed the nature of the work floor. Cyberspace has emerged 
alongside physical space as the place where work is carried out and has led to 
a rise in telecommuting from home. Moreover, the walls of the workspace 
have become permeable: employees at the office are regularly in contact with 
the outside world without immediately visible or audible signs. 
The introduction of ICT in the workplace has affected the power relation 
between employers and employees in different ways. At the empowering end 
of the spectrum, ICT has enabled employees to conduct activities they could 
not do before, or could only do to a limited extent, during working hours or 
from the office. For instance, employees can now make an appointment with 
the dentist, order groceries online, chat with a friend at the other side of the 
world, download pornography, or search the web for more interesting jobs. 
 
 88. See generally Colette Cuijpers, ICT and Employer-Employee Power Dynamics: A 
Comparative Perspective of United States’ and Netherlands’ Workplace Privacy in Light of Information and 
Computer Technology Monitoring and Positioning of Employees, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 37 (2007) (examining how ICT has affected the power balance between employer 
and employee and how adequately the existing legal framework has dealt with the resulting 
shifts in power).  
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The power of employers to make employees do what they would not 
otherwise do (e.g., work) has diminished somewhat as a result. More 
importantly, the power of employers to prevent employees from doing harm 
to the company has diminished. The huge number of outgoing SMS 
messages, e-mails, chats, and tweets, often drafted in informal language, 
could contain statements that are embarrassing or outright harmful for the 
company should they become public. Accounts of employees viewing or e-
mailing pornography during work hours could also be damaging to a 
company’s reputation. Finally, the risk that confidential business secrets or 
confidential documents may be leaked to third parties has grown 
substantially.89 In these respects, ICT has weakened the power of employers. 
In response, employers have taken countermeasures to rebalance the 
power relation. Primarily, they have started to routinely and extensively 
monitor employee communications. Workplace surveillance, by empowering 
the employer with new means of exercising control over employees, 
constitutes a shift in the power relation at the other end of the spectrum. A 
large majority of companies digitally monitor employee communications and 
activities.90 Unsurprisingly, they often discover that employees are engaging 
in inappropriate activities and thereafter dismiss the employees.91 Dismissal, 
of course, is one of the most far-reaching instruments of power employers 
possess (particularly during credit crunch crises), and the ability to dismiss 
 
 89. For an overview of liability risks for employers, see generally Michele Colucci, The 
Impact of the Internet and New Technologies on the Workplace: A Legal Analysis from a Comparative 
Point of View, in BULLETIN OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR (Roger Blanpain ed., 2002). 
 90. A 2007 survey by the American Management Association of 304 American 
companies showed that sixty-six percent monitor internet connections (and sixty-five 
percent block “inappropriate” websites); forty-five percent monitor computer activity, i.e., 
content, keystrokes, and time spent at the computer; forty-three percent monitor e-mail 
(over forty percent of which assign an individual to read e-mail); forty-five percent monitor 
telephones for time spent and numbers called, and sixteen percent record phone 
conversations; nine percent monitor voicemail; forty-eight percent use video surveillance to 
counter theft, violence, or sabotage, and seven percent use video surveillance to monitor on-
the-job performance. Press Release, Am. Mgmt. Ass’n, 2007 Electronic Monitoring and 
Surveillance Survey: Over Half of All Employers Combined Fire Workers for E-Mail & 
Internet Abuse (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://press.amanet.org/-press-
releases/177/2007-electronic-monitoring-surveillance-survey. 
 91. The Am. Mgmt. Ass’n survey showed that thirty percent of companies have fired 
employees for internet misuse, largely for viewing, downloading, or uploading inappropriate 
or offensive content (eighty-four percent), violation of any company policy (forty-eight 
percent), or excessive personal use (thirty-four percent); twenty-eight percent have fired 
employees for e-mail misuse, largely for violation of any company policy (sixty-four percent), 
inappropriate or offensive language (sixty-two percent), excessive personal use (twenty-six 
percent), or breach of confidentiality rules (twenty-two percent); and six percent have fired 
employees for misuse or private use of office phones. Id. 
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following workplace monitoring shows that technology is significantly 
empowering employers by strengthening the tools at their disposal. 
In the United States, legal protection for the traditionally weaker party, 
employees, is found in privacy and employment law. However, the Fourth 
Amendment and the privacy tort of intrusion into seclusion have almost no 
bearing in light of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” doctrine. This is 
because the workplace is rarely considered a space where individuals may 
have any reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly when it comes to use 
of communication facilities provided by the employer.92 ECPA protects 
communications privacy, but provides ample exceptions for employers, 
including the “provider exception,” the “normal course of employment,” and 
obtaining (implied) consent of the employee.93 Employment law does not 
provide significant protection to employees against dismissal, because the 
doctrine of at-will employment still prevails.94 Furthermore, exceptions to 
this doctrine developed in case law only apply in situations involving serious 
breaches of privacy.95 Coupled with the absence of substantial privacy 
 
 92. See Cuijpers, supra note 88 (examining how ICT has affected the power balance 
between employer and employee and how adequately the existing legal framework has dealt 
with the resulting shifts in power); Ariana R. Levinson, Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the 
Employed, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620, 619 (2009) (“[T]he employee’s right of 
privacy is a hollow shell against the lead weight of the employer’s claim to run his business as 
he pleases.” (quoting Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism and Autonomy in American 
Labor Law, 5 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 453, 468 (2001))) (“Most people ‘think they 
enjoy certain privacy protections when they are at work’ but they do not.”); Michael L. 
Rustad & Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-Mail and Internet Usage: Avoiding the 
Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 829 (2005) 
(discussing the prevalence of employer monitoring of employees’ e-mail and Internet use). 
93. The “provider exception” allows any private employer who stores e-mail 
communications on her computer or network to access these communications. The “normal 
course of employment” exception applies when an employer can show that monitoring was 
necessary in the regular practice of employment, for example, to protect her company’s 
property or to provide the internal communication service in a proper manner. The 
“consent” exception allows employers to monitor communications with the consent of 
employees, which includes implicit consent that may be affected when an employer gives 
prior notice to her employees that she will monitor e-mail communications. Cf. Cuijpers, 
supra note 88 (examining how ICT has affected the power balance between employer and 
employee and how adequately the existing legal framework has dealt with the resulting shifts 
in power); Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 92 (discussing the prevalence of employer 
monitoring of employees’ e-mail and Internet use). 
 94. Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment Doctrine: Imposed Terms, 
Implied Terms, and the Normative World of the Workplace, 36 INDUS. L.J. 84, 85 (2007) (“[T]he 
contract is moment to moment for dismissal purposes but ongoing in relation to certain 
employer-imposed terms.”). 
 95. Cuijpers, supra note 88 (examining how ICT has affected the power balance 
between employer and employee and how adequately the existing legal framework has dealt 
with the resulting shifts in power). 
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protection of employees, the current state of employment law offers no 
safeguard for employees against dismissal when workplace monitoring shows 
inappropriate conduct or breach of company policy. 
On paper, employee protection in the Netherlands is more robust. 
European privacy law applies in the workplace context,96 and European data 
protection legislation provides strict rules for processing personal data from 
employees.97 Furthermore, frequent involvement of the Works Council in 
defining monitoring policies provide stronger checks on what a company can 
define as proper use of ICT. However, privacy law is seldom invoked in 
dismissal cases in practice;98 courts usually take recourse in employment law 
under the general standards of “good employership” and “good 
employeeship.”99 Dismissal based on workplace monitoring takes into 
account three aspects: the grounds for workplace monitoring, the general 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, and the presence of a company 
policy with regard to Internet and e-mail use and monitoring. Even if the 
employer’s monitoring was considered illegitimate or disproportionate, the 
dismissal is usually condoned by the courts if the employee’s conduct did not 
conform to “good employeeship” or if the relationship between employer 
and employee has been seriously disrupted, which is usually the case.100 Thus, 
even if employers abuse their power for workplace monitoring, employees 
who do not comply with company standards have little recourse to legal 
protection: they will not be reinstated in their job, nor will they get damages 
for breach of privacy.101 
In summary, employees have gained new possibilities for communicating 
with the world outside the workplace and thus new opportunities for 
conducting personal activities during work hours. However, employer 
surveillance of employee communications has created a considerable risk of 
dismissal for employees if the employer decides that the activities observed 
are inappropriate, unlawful, or embarrassing to the company, or contrary to 
company policy. Legal protection, via privacy and employment law, provides 
employees with little recourse against dismissal if they have not conformed to 
what the employer has unilaterally defined as proper use of company 
 
 96. See Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1992); Halford v. United Kingdom, 
24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523 (1997). 
 97. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 58. 
 98. Cf. Frank Hendrickx, Privacy and Data Protection in the Workplace: The Netherlands, in 
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY?: ELEVEN COUNTRY REPORTS ON CAMERA 
SURVEILLANCE AND WORKPLACE PRIVACY 115, 139 (Sjaak Nouwt et al. eds., 2005). 
 99. BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] book 7, art. 611 (Neth.). 
 100. Cuijpers, supra note 88, at 55. 
 101. Id. 
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facilities. The Netherlands’ legal protection appears to provide stronger 
checks on what a company can define as proper use than that of the United 
States, primarily due to the standard of good employership and the Works 
Council’s hand in limiting monitoring policies. 
B. CASE STUDY 2: LOCATION MONITORING 
New ICTs not only enable monitoring of communications, but also 
facilitate monitoring individuals’ locations. In recent years, the market for 
tracking and tracing devices has boomed and applications in the private 
sector have grown dramatically. However, employers’ use of employee 
localization services is still limited when compared to communications 
monitoring.102 The fact that location tracking may also take place outside of 
company premises and beyond working hours makes it a poignant new 
technology in the employer–employee relationship. Cuijpers distinguishes 
four technologies that can be used for location monitoring: video 
surveillance, radio frequency identification (RFID),103 mobile phone cell ID, 
and the Global Positioning System (GPS) for use outside of company 
premises. For employers whose businesses involve transport, these 
technologies are particularly intriguing. This includes not only taxi or cargo 
companies, but also businesses with company vehicles or company mobile 
phones that can have an interest in monitoring their employees’ whereabouts. 
There are few specific laws regulating location monitoring of employees. 
The legal framework for location monitoring in the United States is much the 
same as that for communications monitoring.104 There is little to no privacy 
protection of employees, despite the fact that GPS can provide detailed 
records of privacy-sensitive locations visited, such as doctors’ offices, 
casinos, striptease clubs, or labor rallies.105 Employers can easily nullify 
reasonable expectations of privacy by notifying employees of their location 
monitoring policy.106 The fact that monitoring has become more intrusive 
due to location monitoring of vehicles, phones, and other company-provided 
gadgets, which easily extend outside of working hours and off premises, does 
 
 102. The AMA survey of 2007 showed that eight percent of companies use GPS for 
tracking company vehicles, three percent use GPS to monitor cell phones, and less than one 
percent use GPS for monitoring employee smartcards. Press Release, Am. Mgmt. Ass’n, 
supra note 90. However, fifty-two percent use smartcards to control physical security and 
access to buildings and data centers, which may also involve some form of location tracking. 
Id. 
 103. RFID uses radio waves for identifying and tracking objects or persons, which are 
particularly useful within company premises. 
 104. See supra Section IV.A. 
 105. Cf. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003). 
 106. Cuijpers, supra note 88, at 70–71. 
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little to alter the legal status of such monitoring. Absent specific legislative 
protection for employees,107 companies can impose any policy governing use 
of the equipment they provide to employees.108 
In the Netherlands, more specific rules apply for processing location 
data, as provided in the Telecommunications Act. These rules, however, 
apply only to publicly provided communications networks or services, and 
companies will often use private networks or services for intra-company 
monitoring. Moreover, the data protection rules for location services are an 
extremely complex amalgam, which makes it difficult for both providers and 
data subjects to interpret which rules apply to which data in which 
situations.109 In the absence of workable specific rules for location data, the 
legal status of location monitoring in the Netherlands, like in the Unites 
States, is much the same as for communications monitoring.110 This means 
that although protection for employees may be better on paper than in the 
United States, it remains to be seen whether this makes a material difference 
in practice. 
C. DISCUSSION 
The shifts in the relationship between employers and employees are more 
straightforward and less multifaceted than the shifts in the relationship 
between governments and citizens; the context in which this relationship 
takes shape, after all, is much smaller and simpler. The two case studies 
covered here—communication and location monitoring—address important 
aspects of employment, illustrating how intensively ICT has affected the 
nature of the workplace and the power relation between employer and 
employee. Two types of shifts take place in this power relation. On the one 
hand, employers lose power to control employees due to the ICT-facilitated 
permeability of the workplace, which allows employees to conduct more on-
duty, non-work-related activities that pose higher risks for causing harm to 
the company. On the other hand, employers gain power to control 
employees by using comprehensive monitoring of communications and, 
increasingly, movement patterns, which may extend to off-duty and off-
premises activities. 
 
 107. Statutory protection in federal and state law is limited and largely related to some 
specific activities, such as off-duty smoking. See Levinson, supra note 92, at 619. 
 108. See Press Release, Am. Mgmt. Ass’n, supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 109. Collette Cuijpers & Bert-Jaap Koops, How Fragmentation in European Law Undermines 
Consumer Protection: The Case of Location-Based Services, 33 EUR. L. REV. 880 (2008). 
 110. Cuijpers, supra note 88 at 73. 
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The shifts in the power relation are symmetrical in that the increased 
surveillance of the workspace is a direct result of the increased permeability 
of the workspace. To the extent that employees benefit from new 
opportunities offered by ICT in the employment context, they are also under 
increased scrutiny when they use these new opportunities. Although this 
might imply that the shifts counterbalance each other, some aspects must be 
taken into account before we can draw conclusions about the legal protection 
of the traditionally weak party in this context. 
First, the shifts in the power relation, even if they are symmetrical, 
broaden the context of employment considerably. The permeability of the 
workspace comes along with a blurring, both in spatial and in temporal 
terms, of work and private life. The exercise of power by the employer 
therefore gains a wider scope of application. Perhaps unlawful or 
inappropriate behavior by employees, even off-duty, has always been 
sufficient cause for dismissal, but the chances of observing such behavior 
and collecting demonstrable evidence of it are considerably higher as 
monitoring of employee behavior widens. 
Second, notification duties play a crucial role. Since most of the ICT 
monitoring is invisible, employees may not be aware of the monitoring unless 
the employer has told them in advance. Because serious potential 
consequences—notably dismissal—can follow depending on what the 
monitoring uncovers, it is justified to at least notify employees of the 
monitoring system and the associated policy. Yet in the United States, only a 
handful of states have legislation requiring notification of electronic 
monitoring.111 In contrast, in the Netherlands, notification is one of the core 
principles of data protection legislation112 and a guideline in the Dutch Data 
Protection Authority’s Framework Policy for E-Mail and Internet Use.113 A 
further mechanism for alerting employees about employee monitoring is 
included in the Dutch Works Councils Act, which requires that personnel 
tracking systems [personeelsvolgsystemen] are approved by the Works Council.114 
Admittedly, having a notification duty on paper does not necessarily 
guarantee that employees are actually made aware; that will depend on the 
 
 111. Phillips, supra note 49; Levinson, supra note 92, at 622 (referring to CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 31–48(d) (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (2002)). 
 112. See Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens [Personal Data Protection Act], Staatsblad 
van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 302 (2000), ch. 5 (Neth.). 
 113. See College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, Raamregeling Voor Het Gebruik van E-
mail en Internet (2002), available at http://www.cbpweb.nl/downloads_av_sv/AV21_-
raamregeling.pdf?refer=true&theme=purple. 
 114. See Dutch Works Councils Act art. 27(1)(1). 
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implementation in practice, for example, in what form and when the 
notification takes place.115 
A third relevant aspect is whether the company policy governing the use 
of company facilities, including computers, Internet, mobile phones, and 
vehicles, strikes a fair balance between employer and employee interests. 
Again, there seem to be better legal safeguards in place in the Netherlands. 
For instance, the Works Councils Act requires works councils to approve 
monitoring policies and a provision in the criminal law prohibits “obvious 
misuse” by the employer of his right to monitor employee 
communications.116 In the United States, collective bargaining mechanisms 
and the National Labor Relations Act may provide some safeguards, but 
these are limited in scope and scale.117 Levinson has argued that the “law of 
the shop” as applied by arbitrators should be used more widely to provide 
better safeguards to employees against arbitrary monitoring.118 
Together, these aspects caution against concluding that the empowering 
and disempowering shifts in the employer–employee relationship 
counterbalance one another. The broadening of the scope of employer 
monitoring, both within the workplace and off-duty and off-premises, is not 
necessarily balanced by the mechanisms for curbing the employer’s power, if 
notification and supervision of the fairness of monitoring policies are largely 
absent, which seems the case in the United States but also, perhaps, in the 
Netherlands due to the lack of enforcement of privacy protection in 
dismissal cases.119 Moreover, even if the policy is fairly balanced and 
employees are duly notified of it, the stakes are higher for employees 
nonetheless: employees are under more prevalent scrutiny, and at times and 
in places that used to be reserved for purely private, non-work-related 
activities. 
 
 115. For example, in small print in a leaflet about company policies given to new 
employees on their first day of work or hidden somewhere in an attic room of the 
company’s internal homepage—neither of which is very likely to truly inform employees—
or, at the other extreme, by a notice appearing on the screen each time the employees log in 
on their computer. 
 116. DUTCH CRIMINAL CODE art. 139c(2)(2). 
 117. Levinson, supra note 92 at 622; cf. M.W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers’ 
Privacy: The United States Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 498 (2002) (noting that “the 
percentage of the civilian labor force eligible for union representation that actually is 
unionized, has fallen to a post-War low of 9.4%”). 
 118. Levinson, supra note 92, at 639; see also National Academy of Arbitrators, 
http://www.naarb.org/ (last visited Sept. 25 2009). 
 119. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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This parallels the two types of collateral damage to citizens caused by the 
arms race in criminal investigation: the risk of interpretation errors and the 
mass disciplining and normalization of behavior by employees.120 
Increased monitoring of employee behavior has amplified the risk of 
errors. For example, if a civil servant searching for public policy information 
absent-mindedly types in www.whitehouse.com (instead of .gov) or 
www.amsterdam.com (instead of .nl) and finds himself confronted with 
flashy X-rated pictures,121 can the monitoring system distinguish him from an 
employee who is actually surfing for adult material? If an employee has to 
deliver a package in the center of Amsterdam and, due to road renovations 
and subway constructions, gets lost and ends up in the red-light district, does 
he have a defense against the proof of the car tracking system? Or what if his 
nineteen-year-old son “borrowed” the car for an excursion into red-light 
nightlife? Such errors in interpretation, including technical errors, can and 
will usually be redressed somewhere in the procedure. Sometimes, however, 
it might be too late; the procedure itself may have a negative effect on the 
employer–employee relationship.122 For example, an employer’s false 
accusation may have induced the employee to circulate enraged messages 
among his colleagues with insulting remarks about his employer. 
More important is the mechanism, comparable to the increased footprint 
of criminal law to cover trivial offenses or antisocial types of behavior, of 
sanctioning employees for undesirable off-duty or off-premises activities that 
do not cause significant harm to the employer, but that nonetheless fall 
within the ambit of “unacceptable” behavior as defined by the employer. 
Although off-duty and off-premises monitoring does not yet take place on a 
large scale, when it happens it has significant potential effects on the freedom 
of employees to behave as they wish. 
Here, we encounter the second face of collateral damage to citizens: the 
potentially disciplining effects of ubiquitous surveillance. Although stricter 
limits apply to the monitoring powers of employers when it comes to off-
duty behavior, monitoring is allowed to a degree by employment or privacy 
 
 120. Supra Section III.D. 
 121. Both sites nowadays are relatively respectable-looking websites, but they started out 
as porn websites. See, e.g., Lodewijk F. Asscher, Schuldige domeinnamen, 10 COMPUTERRECHT 
186 (2003); Jeff Pelline, Whitehouse.com Goes to Porn, CNET NEWS, Sept. 5, 1997, 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-202985.html. 
 122. See generally Cuijpers, supra note 88 (referring to J. Yung, Big Brother IS Watching: How 
Employee Monitoring in 2004 Brought Orwell’s 1984 to Life and What the Law Should do About It, 36 
SETON HALL L. REV. 163, 180 (2005), noting the risk of abuse of power: employers could 
use a relatively harmless incident to fire an employee if they want to get rid of her for other 
reasons that might be less successfully argued in court). 
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law, particularly if it concerns employer-provided equipment, such as a cell 
phone or computer.123 Awareness that the employer is potentially monitoring 
activities conducted with such equipment could lead to (over)cautiousness in 
the use of the equipment. Although an employee could refrain outright from 
using company equipment for personal purposes, that option does not alight 
with the reality of the “new economy.” Private use of employer property 
is often regarded as a kind of fringe benefit. Employees expect 
some leniency with regard to the private use of company assets, 
and the employer often encourages this use to circumvent 
employees’ nine-to-five mentality. A lot of companies provide 
employees with home computers or mobile telephones which they 
can use for private purposes. The added value for employers lies in 
the fact that the employee can be reached for business related 
purposes 24-hours-a-day.124 
In this new constellation of blurred boundaries between office and home, 
and working hours and spare time, the limits of employer surveillance will 
have to be renegotiated. It is not clear, however, that current legal 
mechanisms for employee protection provide employees with sufficient 
bargaining power in this renegotiation process. The easy way out may well be 
to accept the increased monitoring scope and to normalize private behavior 
in a self-disciplining act of conforming to the company standards for 
acceptable behavior. 
Internalizing acceptability standards contributes to the erosive effect of 
technology on privacy.125 David Phillips calls attention to the “vicious 
circularity” of ever more invasive surveillance techniques at the workplace: 
courts have found that employees reduce or extinguish their 
reasonable expectation of privacy when they explicitly consent to 
employers’ search policies. Employers, then, demand such consent 
as a matter of standard business practice. That standard practice 
then becomes implicit in the community norms generally governing 
the workplace surveillance. Eventually, consent to search becomes 
implicit in the employment relationship.126 
 
 123. Levinson, supra note 92. 
 124. Cuijpers, supra note 88, at 85. 
 125. See generally Bert-Jaap Koops & Ronald Leenes, “Code” and the Slow Erosion of Privacy, 
12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 115 (2005) (finding that technology generally makes 
privacy violations easier and erodes reasonable expectations of privacy). 
 126. Phillips, supra note 49, at 60. 
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Communications monitoring can already be called a standard practice; 
location monitoring is only beginning to be included in employer policies.127 
If both types of monitoring continue in the vicious circularity of ingrained, 
normalized standards, then the workplace will acquire distinct characteristics 
of the Panopticon and Foucauldian self-disciplining effects on employees. 
Current protection mechanisms based on transparency (notification) and 
consent (employment at will) seem inadequate to deal with such a shift in the 
power relationship between employers and employees. 
V. BUSINESS–CONSUMER128 
This Part examines technology-related changes in the power relation of 
businesses and consumers, and assesses the consequences of these changes 
for consumer protection. The two following case studies—profiling and 
behavioral advertising and buying goods or services online—suggest that, 
although both consumers and businesses gain substantially in their 
information position, businesses gain considerably more power to seduce 
consumers to buy goods that they would not otherwise buy. The subsequent 
general discussion will analyze whether current legal measures of consumer 
protection are equipped to deal with businesses’ exercise of power. 
Particularly relevant here is the second dimension of power: the indirect 
influencing of consumers’ actions through “agenda-setting” mechanisms of 
targeted advertising and website design.129 
A. CASE STUDY 1: PROFILING AND BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 
Commerce often starts with advertising. Traditionally, this is a fairly 
crude mechanism. Advertisements are directed at a large group of people 
who happen to read the same newspaper or watch the same television 
channel; and businesses can only target their advertising to the extent that 
they know something about the average consumer of the medium. ICT is 
enabling the use of profiling techniques to offer personalized advertising to 
consumers. This mechanism is relatively new and qualitatively different from 
the traditional information position of businesses. Profiling provides a new 
type of knowledge, based on patterns discovered by correlating data in 
 
 127. See generally Cuijpers, supra note 88. 
 128. This Section builds on Colette Cuijpers, The Influence of ICT on Consumer Protection: 
Empowerment or Impairment of the Consumer? (TILT Law & Tech. Working Paper Series, Paper 
No. 015/2009, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=-
1515790. 
 129. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the second dimension 
of power. 
0973-1036 KOOPS WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2010 10:44 AM 
2010] SHIFTING POWER RELATIONS 1007 
 
databases.130 Information about consumption patterns, such as different 
products that certain types of consumers often buy together or types of 
books that people with certain characteristics are more likely to buy, can be 
used to target advertising to specific consumers in concrete contexts. Rather 
than displaying any advertising banner, a website may choose a specific 
advertisement based on the prospective buyer’s clickstream, search words, 
zip code, or other data that the user has filled in on a web form. 
Such personalized or behavioral advertising is a promising innovation in 
commerce. Since it customizes the advertising to align with the consumer’s 
inferred interests, it can be more effective for both businesses and 
consumers. Indeed, personalization can be “an effective tool to achieve an 
efficient market.”131 However, the promise does not come without threats. 
Behavioral advertising is usually based on group profiles, which will almost 
always be probabilistic and non-distributive, i.e., not all members of the 
group defined by the profile will share all the attributes of the group 
profile.132 In other words, false positives are bound to occur: someone who 
has bought Koontz’s Mr. Murder and Weldon’s The Cloning of Joanna May 
because she is interested in fiction about clones may not be at all interested in 
other pulp thrillers or feminist novels. Some targeted advertisements will 
therefore miss their mark, through false positives and false negatives. 
Although this may lead to “unanticipated encounters” in which consumers 
are confronted with undesirable or irritating information that they have not 
sought out,133 this is not generally a serious threat. Compared to traditional, 
non-personalized advertising, the error rate, particularly of false positives, will 
be much lower and missed opportunities for advertising do not impair the 
ability of consumers to buy goods of their own initiative.134 
 
 130. Mireille Hildebrandt, Defining Profiling: A New Type of Knowledge?, in PROFILING THE 
EUROPEAN CITIZENS 17 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008). 
 131. Simone van der Hof & Corien Prins, Personalisation and Its Influence on Identities, 
Behaviour and Social Values, in PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN 111 (Mireille Hildebrandt 
& Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008). 
 132. See BART HERMAN MARIA CUSTERS, THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE: ETHICAL, 
LEGAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DATA MINING AND GROUP PROFILING IN 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 61 (2004) (discussing non-distributivity). 
 133. Cass R. Sunstein, The Daily We: Is the Internet Really a Blessing for Democracy?, BOSTON 
REV., Summer 2001, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR26.3/sunstein.html. 
 134. There may be a concern, however, if the targeted advertising is based on sensitive 
data, even if the consumer is not personally identifiable; consumers can then “view it as 
invasive or, in a household where multiple users access one computer, it may reveal 
confidential information about an individual to other members.” Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Online Behavioral Advertising: Moving the Discussion Forward to Possible Self-
Regulatory Principles 5 (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/-
P859900stmt.pdf. But cf. van der Hof & Prins, supra note 131. 
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There is a more subtle and serious threat being exercised in behavioral 
advertising, which relates to the second dimension of power.135 By 
personalizing the offers shown to online consumers, businesses influence the 
horizon of consumers’ interest: it is a form of agenda-setting. This “may 
force individuals into restrictive two-dimensional models,”136 reducing the 
consumer’s areas of interest into simplified machine-readable patterns and 
resulting in a potential loss of nuances and of occasional side-steps into 
marginal or new areas of interest. It may also lead to normalization of 
consuming behavior, through the panoptic logic of “the system”: 
[w]hen the system seems to know what you want better and earlier 
than you do, how can you know where these desires really come 
from? . . . [P]rofiles will begin to normalize the population from 
which the norm is drawn. The observing will affect the observed. 
The system watches what you do; it fits you into a pattern; the 
pattern is then fed back to you in the form of options set by the 
pattern; the options reinforce the patterns; the cycle begins again.137 
In other words, if you are persistently being offered pulp thrillers and 
feminist novels because your online bookshops think you should be 
interested in them, you might as well give it a try because there should be 
some merit to the recommendations (why else would the system give them?), 
thereby reinforcing your profile and leading to more of the same offers. 
Thus, you might well end up reading only these types of books because it 
is—by the system and through panoptic logic by yourself—expected of you. 
How do current legal-protection mechanisms deal with behavioral 
advertising? In general, data protection cannot be invoked as long as group 
profiles are being used to show ads to unidentifiable online consumers.138 
However, if a European consumer is identifiable, for example by an IP 
address,139 when showing her an ad based on a group profile of certain online 
 
 135. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the second dimension 
of power. 
 136. Van der Hof & Prins, supra note 131, at 121. 
 137. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 154 (1999). 
 138. This constitutes one of the weaknesses of the Data Protection Directive in an 
online environment, since potential privacy or discrimination threats to web users often do 
not depend on their being identifiable as Jill the Plumber from Tuscaloosa, Alabama, but on 
their being recognized as being the same person as an earlier website visitor or their being 
traced throughout a session. See Ronald E. Leenes, Do You Know Me? Decomposing Identifiability 
(Tilburg Univ. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 001/2008, 2008) (distinguishing between 
L-identifiability (‘looking-up’), R-identifiability (‘recognition’), and S-identifiability 
(‘session’)). 
 139. IP addresses can be considered as personal data. See ARTICLE 29 DATA 
PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 4/2007 ON THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL DATA 
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behavior or personal characteristics, her personal data are covered within the 
ambit of the Data Protection Directive. The Directive also applies to the 
collection of behavioral or personal information from identifiable consumers. 
This theoretically could provide some legal protection, for example, against 
disproportionate collection of data or application of a “wrong” group profile; 
but it is highly dubious whether the Directive can actually be enforced in 
such a context.140 
In the United States, no specific data protection rule seems to apply to 
the collection of data and the display of advertisements in this context. The 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), however, has recommended that 
[e]very website where data is collected for behavioral advertising 
should provide a clear, concise, consumer-friendly, and prominent 
statement that (1) data about consumers’ activities online is being 
collected at the site for use in providing advertising about products 
and services tailored to individual consumers’ interests, and (2) 
consumers can choose whether or not to have their information 
collected for such purpose.141 
Much of the efficacy of such a recommendation will depend on how 
consumers are being informed and given a choice—only a handful of 
knowledgeable and privacy-aware consumers might be able to understand 
and act upon the issue.142 Moreover, it remains to be seen whether business 
self-regulation as advocated by the FTC really works in this area. 
 
16–17 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/-
2007/wp136_en.pdf. This is not uncontested in the literature, but Opinions of the Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party serve as important guidelines for courts in the E.U. to 
interpret the Data Protection Directive. 
 140. One wonders what Amazon.co.uk would include in a reply to a request from a 
Dutch customer such as:  
Could you inform me on what basis you recommended E.M. Forster’s 
Maurice and Baldwin’s Giovanni’s Room to me (see Wet bescherming 
persoonsgegevens [Dutch Data Protection Act], art. 35), whether this 
relates to my having bought Leavitt’s The Lost Language of Cranes last 
month (see id. at art. 33) and whether you have therefore profiled me as 
being interested in homosexuality, which is sensitive personal data (see id. 
at art. 16), and would you please delete all these data since it is unlawful 
for you to process them (see id.) and irrelevant for my buying books with 
you (see id. at art. 36(1)), and can you inform me in writing of your having 
deleted my sensitive personal data (see id. at art. 36(2))? 
 141. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 134, at 3. 
 142. Id. (noting that “panelists recognized that many consumers do not read privacy 
policies and raised a genuine question about consumers’ willingness and ability to read and 
understand long disclosures about privacy”). 
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Specifically relevant in this case study is the legal protection against 
deceptive advertising. This, after all, is the true concern about enticing 
consumers to buy goods they would not otherwise buy. Deceptive 
advertising is thus seen as an abusive exercise of power by businesses; to 
protect consumers, this is prohibited both in European and U.S. 
legislation.143 However, as with data protection rules, this legal protection will 
be difficult to enforce; consumers are often unaware of the practice, and 
even if they are, the damage for each individual consumer deceived by a 
behavioral advertisement will usually be relatively low compared to the time, 
money, and tools they have to invest in pursuing a contract or tort claim.144 
More importantly, however, it is not clear whether behavioral advertising is at 
all deceptive. The purpose, after all, is to better target the offer to the 
consumer’s own preferences, and the personalization as such does not make 
it manipulative. Only the agenda-setting and interest-shaping aspect of 
behavioral advertising could be considered deceptive for consumers who 
embrace the profile underlying the advertisement through panoptic logic,145 
even though they had no obvious prior interest in the offered product. But it 
is unlikely that this subtly manipulative effect, which works through an act of 
double anticipation by the consumer herself,146 is sufficient to fall within the 
scope of deceptive advertising rules. 
B. CASE STUDY 2: BUYING ONLINE 
The advent of e-commerce has provided consumers not only with a new 
means to do old business—buying goods or services—but also opened up a 
far wider range for conducting this business. Rather than leaving their homes 
to shop locally, consumers can now search for goods around the world. With 
automated search engines, websites comparing products and prices, and 
 
 143. See, e.g., Directive 2005/29/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22 (EC); Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 42–58 (2006); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 144. See Marla Pleyte, Online Undercover Marketing: A Reminder of the FTC’s Unique Position 
to Combat Deceptive Practices, 6 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 14 (2006); Willem van Boom & Marco 
Loos, Effective Enforcement of Consumer Law in Europe: Private, Public, and Collective Mechanisms, in 
COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW 231 (Willem H. Van Boom & Marco 
Loos eds., 2007). 
 145. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 146. I.e., the consumer changes her preferences—buying a product she would not 
otherwise have bought—in anticipation of the interest profile she thinks is reflected in the 
advertisement that anticipates her preferences. On the similar mechanism of double 
anticipation in identity building, see WP7, D7.14A: WHERE IDEM-IDENTITY MEETS IPSE-
IDENTITY: CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATIONS (Mireille Hildebrandt et al. eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-WP7-del7.14a-idem_meets_ipse_-
conceptual_explorations.pdf. See also infra Section VI.A. 
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auction and trading sites, consumers have an array of tools available to help 
them find the best products for the lowest prices. 
There are more aspects in which ICT is empowering consumers. They 
can form ad hoc online collectives that use mass buying to obtain the lowest 
possible price from e-sellers.147 Similarly, businesses are being profiled by ad 
hoc collections of consumers who together build and maintain ratings 
websites with assessments of businesses’ quality, service level, and reliability. 
A hotel owner now must not only be friendly to Mr. Michelin or Miss Lonely 
Planet when they visit once a year, but to each and every customer, or risk 
receiving unfavorable reviews on a rating website. 
This does not imply, however, that the Internet constitutes a Shangri-La 
of pervasive consumer power. Rating and experience-sharing websites are 
not necessarily reliable: 
[t]his valuable source of information is diminished when online 
undercover marketers are allowed to surreptitiously infiltrate such 
sites and plant self-interested messages about their products. These 
advertisers are well-funded and sophisticated enough to craft 
messages that are extremely believable and likely to induce 
consumer reliance. As a result, these practices turn a valuable 
source of information into a source of disinformation for 
consumers.148 
In other words, the potentially most powerful tool for consumer 
empowerment—peer review—may backfire, since businesses can turn it to 
their own advantage to seduce consumers to buy their products. 
When we focus on the actual online buying process, we observe that 
consumers no longer depend on the local bookstore or camera shop; they 
also can shop from their desk chair for the best deal in as large a region as 
they care to explore. Moreover, websites allow for a full presentation of the 
general terms and conditions, rather than a scant reference to paper 
documents that can be inspected somewhere or snail-mailed upon request. 
E-consumers thus have, in principle, a much wider scope for buying as well 
as better knowledge of the product and the terms and conditions covering 
the sale. 
 
 147. Robert J. Kauffman & Bin Wang, Bid Together, Buy Together: On the Efficacy of Group-
Buying Business Models in Internet-Based Selling, in THE E-BUSINESS HANDBOOK 99 (Paul 
Benjamin Lowry et al. eds., 2002). For examples of collective buying sites, see, for example, 
Groupon Deal of the Day: Find Great Deals on Fun Things to Do in San Francisco, 
http://www.groupon.com/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2009) and Pingel Partner, 
http://www.pingelpartner.nl/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2009). 
 148. Pleyte, supra note 144. 
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Several obstacles, however, decrease the empowering potential of online 
buying. A website’s design can make a business’ terms and conditions 
difficult to find. Alternately, consumers are increasingly presented with terms 
and conditions before they can make a purchase. However, because the 
terms and conditions are obfuscated by legalese and small print, few e-
consumers will read and understand these terms. Furthermore, a physical 
product cannot be seen, let alone touched and immediately taken away. Thus, 
the consumer has to rely on pictures and on the seller’s reliability to send the 
correct product depicted in the image. 
This uncertainty is offset by increased options for redress. The European 
Distance-Selling Directive, for example, allows consumers to return online-
purchased goods without providing a reason within seven days.149 Still, 
returning a defective good will not always be cost-effective for consumers if 
the defect is relatively small—receiving a yellow coffee machine when you 
thought you were ordering an orange one—particularly if the consumer 
needs to spend precious time on repackaging and going to the post office. 
Finally, “scattered damage” (i.e., many trifling losses that are too minor for 
individuals to seek redress for, but that constitute a significant loss on a 
collective scale) is a problem that will occur more frequently as e-commerce 
expands. 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle is that these downsides are exacerbated in 
the cross-border context of online commerce. Terms and conditions are not 
necessarily available in one’s own language (particularly for native speakers of 
relatively small languages, such as Dutch, Italian, or Hungarian, not to 
mention minority languages like Frisian or Kwakiutl). The contract may be 
embedded in foreign legal systems with possibly unfamiliar rules and 
presuppositions. And redress is more costly and cumbersome when returning 
a package to businesses abroad. Some mechanisms for cross-border redress 
are starting to emerge, for example, in the network of European Consumer 
Centres.150 
Another relevant aspect is what happens with the consumer data that are 
gathered by businesses throughout the process. ICT can empower 
businesses, who can gather huge amounts of information about consumers 
through mechanisms such as cookies and web forms. Privacy statements will 
inform consumers about the purposes and conditions for processing the 
personal data collected during e-commerce activities, but it is unclear how 
 
 149. Directive 97/7/EC, art. 6, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (EC). 
 150. See ECC-Net, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/index_en.htm (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2010). 
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many consumers actually find, read, and understand privacy statements. Even 
if they do, it is not clear to what extent they can effectively resist undesirable 
provisions—such as selling data to third parties—in a market that is 
dominated by information brokers. 
The legal protection of consumers has already been adapted in several 
respects to the new reality of e-commerce, at least in Europe. The E.U. 
“Consumer Acquis” consists of many directives with consumer-protection 
rules.151 Particularly relevant here are the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive and the Distance Selling Directive.152 These contain numerous 
information obligations, such as requirements to provide information 
beforehand in a comprehensible and durable form,153 and balancing 
requirements to enhance the fairness of terms and conditions.154 The current 
framework of European consumer protection, nevertheless, is very 
fragmented, and a new Directive on Consumer Rights has been proposed 
that aims to bring together and harmonize key consumer rights.155 In contrast 
to the European legislative approach, “[t]he U.S. legal system has tried, at 
times awkwardly, to fit the new transactions into existing doctrinal 
categories,”156 which leaves consumer protection primarily to the market. 
Altogether, the information gains that the Internet allows constitute a 
significant shift towards consumer empowerment. However, this 
empowerment is lessened by several factors, such as the risk of information 
overload and the non-transparent nature of many information providing 
websites that may manipulate results for commercial reasons. Nevertheless 
the information position of ICT-savvy consumers is superior to their 
information position in traditional, physical-space commerce. The scope for 
buying goods has also expanded enormously, and despite obstacles for e-
commerce, notably in cross-border contexts, this can likewise be seen as a 
 
 151. The “Consumer Acquis” is an umbrella term used to indicate the widespread 
collection of consumer-protection rules in E.U. legislation. See generally Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, COM (2008) 614 final (Oct. 8, 
2008) (reviewing the Consumer Acquis, including a number of directives on consumer 
protection, and proposing changes to simplify and harmonize the current fragmented 
regulatory framework). 
 152. Directive 2005/29/EC, supra note 143; Directive 97/7/EC, supra note 149. 
 153. See Directive 97/7/EC, supra note 149, at art. 4–5; Directive 2000/31, art. 5, 6, 10, 
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC). 
 154. See Directive 2005/29/EC, supra note 143, at art. 3. 
 155. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, 
COM (2008) 614 final (Oct. 8, 2008). 
 156. Jane K. Winn & Brian H. Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the U.S. 
and the EU, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 190 (2006). 
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significant empowerment of consumers, supported as they are by new 
consumer-protection rules in legislation or case-law doctrine. 
Some caution is warranted, however, when it comes to assessing the 
overall effect on consumers at large: not all consumers benefit equally from 
the new possibilities. These new possibilities are perhaps real options only 
for experienced ICT users with a sufficiently perceptive and critical attitude 
to web-based information sources. Furthermore, the information position of 
businesses is also strengthened considerably, through information- collecting, 
sharing, and profiling tools. They can use this information to better attract 
and bind consumers to them. Just as consumers have access to a broader 
array of businesses, businesses also have significantly increased their 
capability for finding customers. With the varied effect on different types of 
consumer groups, this implies that less ICT-savvy and less critical consumers 
may now be more vulnerable to abusive exercises of power by businesses. 
C. DISCUSSION 
The commerce context presents perhaps the most empowering potential 
of ICT yet encountered in the case studies. The Internet has opened up a 
wide range of opportunities for consumers to counter businesses’ efforts to 
seduce them into buying their products and services. Gathering information, 
shopping irrespective of place, and forming consumer collectives are 
important consumer-empowering mechanisms. One might question to what 
extent all consumers benefit from these possibilities: perhaps only the 
technology-savvy consumers are exploiting them in practice. Compared to 
the other power relations studied here, consumers benefit more from new 
technology-facilitated opportunities than citizens in their relationship with 
the government, but perhaps less than employees in their relationship with 
the employer. Determining to what extent the “average” consumer actually 
makes use of information-gathering and collective-pressure mechanisms is a 
matter for further study.157 
 
 157. The current legal status of the average consumer with respect to her ICT awareness 
or tech-savviness is indeterminate. For example, European Court of Justice case-law on the 
free movement of goods and services seems to assume a relatively high level of activity and 
knowledge of consumers, whereas the Consumer Acquis—the fragmented system of 
consumer protection in many first-pillar Directives—seems to treat the consumer as 
relatively passive and poor-informed. See Hannes Unberath & Angus Johnston, The Double-
Headed Approach of the ECJ Concerning Consumer Protection, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1237 
(2007); Vanessa Mak, Harmonisation Through ‘Directive-Related’ and ‘Cross-Directive’ Interpretation: 
The Role of the ECJ in the Development of European Consumer Law (Tilburg Inst. of Comparative 
& Transnational Law, Working Paper No. 2008/8, 2008). 
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At the same time, ICT also has significant empowering effects for 
businesses, who can gather huge amounts of information about consumers, 
both specifically through tools like cookies and web forms and generically 
through profiling. They can also target consumers cost-effectively with 
advertisements and offers, on a massive scale unimaginable in the pre-ICT 
era (i.e., spam) but also on an individual, personalized level (i.e., behavioral 
advertising). 
Both consumers and businesses have thus gained substantially in their 
information position. Like the case of employers and employees, it is far 
from evident that these trends counterbalance each other, particularly since 
the trends are less clearly intertwined than in the workplace monitoring 
cases.158 With some justification, Dholakia and Zwick conclude that “[t]he 
power balance has shifted to the marketers.”159 After all, the strengthened 
position of businesses gives them considerable power to seduce consumers 
to buy goods they would not otherwise buy. 
This increased power can only be outweighed by the empowering 
information-gathering possibilities for consumers, provided that the business 
activities are sufficiently transparent for the consumer. This is a key issue 
both in behavioral advertising and in online buying with impenetrable terms 
and conditions and privacy statements. Does the consumer in these 
situations know on what basis she is being offered something, or what will 
happen with the personal data that are collected when she buys something 
online? The legal protection of consumers has been adapted in some respects 
to the new reality of e-commerce, through information obligations aimed at 
enhanced transparency.160 Such measures surely help to balance the power 
relation, but they are probably insufficient to protect consumers in all 
 
 158. See supra Section IV.C. 
 159. Nikhilesh Dholakia & Detlev Zwick, Privacy and Consumer Agency in the Information 
Age: Between Prying Profilers and Preening Webcams, 1 J. RES. FOR CONSUMERS 18–19 (2001), 
available at http://www.jrconsumers.com/academic_articles/issue_1?f=5800. As they 
observe, 
real-time customization of interactive messages can actually limit the 
ability of the consumer to shape his or her ideas of market prices, product 
variability, and quality, among other things. In such a scenario—of which 
we can see the first signs in the electronic marketspace—real-time 
interactivity does not enable consumer choice and informed decision-
making, but delimits consumer freedom and unrestrained agency in the 
market. 
Id. at 12–13; cf. LYON, supra note 71, at 127–28 (noting that “while the public awareness of 
consumer surveillance may be rising, it is undoubtedly doing so at a rate far slower than the 
opportunities for consumer surveillance are being exploited”). 
 160. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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respects. Several authors stress that more legal protection is needed to 
decrease the information asymmetry between consumers and business,161 to 
increase transparency,162 and to allow more room for collective action in 
order to address the problem of large amounts of small individual damages 
where access to justice for individual consumers is unattractive.163 
Two issues also call for attention, relating closely to the two faces of 
collateral damage identified in the government–citizen power relation 
shifts.164 First, the consumer has become more vulnerable through the 
increased collection and storage of personal data. Not only can these data be 
used for other purposes—for example, when sold to third parties—but they 
can also be leaked through inadequate security measures, and subsequently 
be used for financial identity theft.165 The lack of a potent and practically 
enforceable data protection regime166 is apparent. Also, the occurrence of 
interpretation errors may be relevant; for example, the product searched for 
or bought might be for someone else—a gift, a purchase for a bed-ridden 
neighbor, or a family member to whom you lent your credit card. This will 
not always lead to concrete damage, but the erroneous profile thus 
 
 161. E.g., Hildebrandt, supra note 68, at 308; Els Soenens, Web Usage Mining for Web 
Personalisation in Customer Relation Management, in PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN: 
CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 175, 180 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 
2008). 
 162. Detlev Zwick & Nikhilesh Dholakia, Whose Identity Is It Anyway? Consumer 
Representation in the Age of Database Marketing, 24 J. MACROMARKETING 31, 40–41 (2004) 
(arguing that “the power to constitute consumer identity . . . is located within the database 
and that ‘only if consumers are given full access to companies’ customer databases can they 
maintain a sense of control over their identities in the marketplace”). 
 163. Van Boom & Loos, supra note 144. 
 164. See supra Section III.D; see also supra Section IV.C. 
 165. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Chandler, Negligence Liability for Breaches of Data Security, 23 
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 223 (2008) (discussing the need for civil liability to increase data 
security and problems plaintiffs face in civil lawsuits); Sasha Romanosky et al., Do Data 
Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft? (Sept. 16, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1268926. 
 166. Note the overall conclusion of Neil Robinson et al., Review of the European Data 
Protection Directive (2009) that 
as we move toward a globally networked society, the Directive as it stands 
will not suffice in the long term. While the widely applauded principles of 
the Directive will remain as a useful front-end, they will need to be 
supported by a harms-based back-end in order to cope with the growing 
challenge of globalisation and international data flows. 
Id. at vii; see also F. FABBRINI ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY ON ASSESSMENT OF 
DATA PROTECTION MEASURES AND RELEVANT INSTITUTIONS (EUI, 2009) (noting several 
deficiencies in compliance); cf. supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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established could lead to future disadvantages, for example, when profile-
based price discrimination is introduced.167 
Second, there is the same potential disciplining effect resulting from 
awareness of being watched as in the previous power relations. As various 
authors have noted, “private entities are happily and busily creating their own 
independent Panopticons,”168 and surreptitiously, “consumers are being 
disciplined by consumption itself to obey the rules, to be ‘good’ not because it is 
morally preferable to being ‘bad’ but because there is no conceivable 
alternative to being good, other than being put outside the reach of 
benefits.”169 The second and third dimensions of power (the indirect 
influencing of people’s actions)170 that are at play here surely call for 
reflection on the legal protection of consumers, since most consumer 
protection mechanisms focus on the exercise of the most visible first 
dimension of power (directly causing the consumer to do something which 
she would not otherwise do). 
Before we take an integrated look at the three power relations we have 
studied, however, it is interesting to note that, perhaps more than in the 
previous power relations, the consumer domain itself shows signs of 
resistance against the panoptic gaze of e-businesses. Successful grassroots 
campaigns have fought many sometimes absurdly privacy-invasive 
applications proposed by companies, such as Intel’s “Big Brother inside” 
chip,171 Sony’s rootkit,172 information-hungry RFID chips,173 NebuAd,174 and 
 
 167. On price discrimination, see, for example, Rajiv Dewan et al., Product Customization 
and Price Competition on the Internet, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1055 (2003) (examining the effect of 
product customization on price in markets with monopolies and duopolies). While price 
discrimination based on an incorrect profile could equally benefit the consumer, from a 
Rawlsian perspective of fairness and consumer protection, the possible disadvantage of 
being offered a higher price based on incorrect data carries more weight than the possible 
advantage of being offered a lower price based on incorrect data. 
 168. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 853 (2000). 
 169. REGINALD WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: HOW TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS 
BECOMING A REALITY 142 (1999); see also Dholakia & Zwick, supra note 159, at 10 (“The 
superpanopticon erected by the new information entrepreneurs allows personal data to play 
a distinctive role in the modern STP (segmenting, targeting, and positioning) marketing 
process” and this “bestows consumer-friendly concepts like ‘customization’ and 
‘personalization’ with the dark aura of totalitarian control.”); Koops & Leenes, supra note 
125, at 118, 129–32. 
 170. See supra Section II.A. 
 171. Intel’s new Pentium III chip was proposed to include a unique Processor Serial 
Number, enabling identification of each and every single computer. Big Brother Inside, 
Latest News, April 28, 2000, http://bigbrotherinside.org/. 
 172. Sony’s rootkit consisted of spyware on music CDs that was automatically installed 
on computers and created security vulnerabilities for the computers. See Wikipedia, Sony 
BMG CD Copy Protection Scandal, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_CD_copy_-
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Webwise.175 An unorthodox, if perhaps rather desperate, anti-surveillance 
strategy could also be perceived in digital exhibitionism: 
[u]ltraexhibitionism, we argue, is not a negation of privacy but an 
attempt to reclaim some control over the externalization of information. As 
such, ultraexhibitionism is to be understood as an act of resistance 
against the surreptitious modes of profiling, categorization, and 
identity definition that are being performed by others on the 
consumer whenever he or she enters the electronic 
“consumptionscape.”176 
Thus, the active disclosure of large amounts of detailed personal 
information on the Internet could emerge as a new strategy of consumers to 
counter the risks of errors and panopticism associated with the increasing 
profiling power of businesses. 
VI. THE IDENTITY OF THE CITIZEN–CONSUMER–
EMPLOYEE 
The previous Parts have discussed three distinct power relations 
involving different roles of individuals. Several similarities can be observed in 
the developments of the domains discussed, which suggest that certain 
general conclusions can be drawn on technology-related shifts in power 
relations and their consequences for legal protection.177 Before drawing such 
conclusions, however, we must face a new issue that emerges from the 
discussion. Some shifts in power relations broaden or blur contexts, 
particularly with the creation and interconnection of public and private 
databases that cross the boundaries of law enforcement, employment, and 
commerce. This calls into question the sectoral approach to inequality 
compensation. Is it enough to protect individuals in their role as citizen, 
employee, and consumer, or should we also seek legal protection for 
 
protection_scandal (last modified Feb. 5, 2010). 
 173. RFID chips are “smart” chips for wireless identification of objects at small 
distances, enabling for example tracing of consumer products. See CONSUMERS AGAINST 
SUPERMARKET PRIVACY INVASION & NUMBERING ET AL., RFID POSITION STATEMENT OF 
CONSUMER PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ORGANIZATIONS (2003), http://www.privacy-
rights.org/ar/RFIDposition.htm. 
 174. NebuAd was a company offering a service for behavioral advertising with ISPs 
transferring user communications to NebuAd for real-time profile-based advertising. 
Wikipedia, NebuAd, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NebuAd (last modified May 20, 2010). 
 175. Webwise is a profile-based advertising system from Phorm, similar to NebuAd. See 
Antiphorm, http://www.antiphorm.co.uk/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010); Wikipedia, Phorm, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phorm (last modified Nov. 13, 2009). 
 176. Dholakia & Zwick, supra note 159, at 13. 
 177. See infra Sections VII.A & VII.B. 
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individuals regardless of their role? To answer these questions, we need to 
broaden our view and look deeper into the identity of today’s individuals. 
This Part will start with a description of how identity construction takes 
place, in a context-dependent presentation of someone’s self in her various 
roles in everyday life. The discussion will draw upon the findings of the 
previous Parts to argue that the shifts in power relations of the citizen–
employee–consumer result in a mixing of contexts, which could well become 
responsible for a digital identity crisis. Moreover, another development 
affecting identity construction is taking place—panopticism. These insights 
in identity construction of today’s individuals will subsequently be of use 
when overall conclusions are drawn on legal protection of weak parties in the 
next and final Part. 
A. ROLE-PLAYING, IDENTITY, AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT 
Until this point, we have encountered three characters in search of legal 
protection: the citizen, the employee, and the consumer. They are embodied 
in a single person, manifestations of an actor playing different roles in 
different contexts to which different areas of the law apply—constitutional 
and administrative law, labor law, and contract and tort law, respectively. I 
purposefully use the imagery of the stage here; Erving Goffman has shown 
how the presentation of the self in everyday life builds on the ability to set 
the stage that defines the situation in which others form opinions of oneself 
and to act a part that conveys the most favorable impressions of oneself.178 
The ability to influence the conduct of others by this role-playing and stage-
setting is a crucial part of social life.179 
Self-presentation is equally crucial for identity-building and self-
development, since the sense of self develops according to how we perceive 
others to perceive us. We construct our identities by anticipating how others 
are profiling us.180 For example, Johnny believes himself to be a cool guy, not 
because wearing Calvin Klein intrinsically makes him cool, but because 
Johnny thinks his peer group will think him cool when they see him wearing 
Calvin Klein underpants. 
In power relations between A and B, the ability of B to control the 
presentation of self—and therefore construct an identity—is impaired, since 
it is usually A rather than B who sets the stage. This is why many legal 
mechanisms to protect weak parties aim at enhancing their ability to control 
the situation, by decreasing the information asymmetry, giving them access to 
 
 178. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). 
 179. Id. 
 180. WP7, supra note 146, at 15–17. 
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mechanisms for redress, or increasing their ability to make autonomous 
choices. Data protection is often presented as informational self-
determination: the ability of data subjects to control the dissemination of 
information about themselves.181 
The process of identity construction is dynamic and time-dependent, 
building a continuously adaptive narrative of “who I am.”182 It is also 
context-specific; my sense of self is not a single, clearly definable “I,” but a 
complex amalgam of different “mes,” which come to the forefront in 
different settings.183 Within the context of this Article, the fact that I am a 
researcher at the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society is more 
relevant than my being a Dutch citizen or an online buyer of books, and 
consequently, I present more credentials relating to my scholarship than to 
my political inclinations or my customer profile at Amazon.184 In other 
contexts, however, my role as a citizen or a consumer may be more 
prominent, and—just like my anticipation of the reactions to this Article 
influence my self-presentation and self-image as a scholar—my identity as a 
citizen or a consumer will be influenced by what happens to me, and by what 
I make happen, in those contexts. 
These insights into role-playing and identity construction are presented 
here to illustrate a crucial point for this Article’s theme. The legal protection 
of weak parties in power relations is defined by the roles these parties play, 
and these roles are played out in separate contexts regulated by separate areas 
of the law. However, having observed some shifts in power relations taking 
place that broaden or blur contexts, we should ask whether these contexts 
 
 181. See seminally, ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967), and in the 
European context the Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 
Dec. 15, 1983, 1 BvR 209 (F.R.G.), available at http://beck-online.beck.de/?vpath-
=bibdata%2fents%2flmrr%2f1983%2fcont%2fLMRR.1983.0056.htm. Whether data 
protection as embodied in the American fair information processing principles or the 
European Data Protection Directive actually effectuates informational self-determination is 
another matter. The competing interest of the free flow of information and services in the 
internal E.U. market have also set their stamp on data protection legislation, leaving the data 
subject with relatively toothless tools to control the flow of her personal data in today’s 
information economy and database nations. See supra note 166. 
 182. WP7, supra note 146, at 15–17. 
 183. On the different narratives that can be told about one’s life and how these 
narratives complicate the construction of a singular identity, see KAREL ČAPEK, AN 
ORDINARY LIFE (M. & R. Weatherall trans., 1936). 
 184. Admittedly, literature can teach important lessons about scholarly questions, so that 
my roles as a researcher and as a reader of fiction intermingle, making some of my Amazon 
profile shimmer through in this article. See JOHN GIBSON, FICTION AND THE WEAVE OF 
LIFE (2007); cf. ČAPEK, supra note 183. 
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are still sufficiently separate, or separable, to determine the role and 
consequent legal status of an individual in the information society. 
B. A DIGITAL IDENTITY CRISIS? 
The shifts in power relations in the case studies partly occur within each 
separate context. Both the strong and the weak parties have in some sense 
gained power in relation to the other. In fact, today the same person can play 
different roles on both sides of the power relation. The most notable of the 
dual roles is the “prosumer,” a person who is a consumer acting as a 
producer.185 This also occurs in the rise of citizens participating in public 
policy-making186 and of the self-employed worker. Some individuals, but by 
no means all, thus gather experience playing the role of the traditionally 
strong party on some occasions, which may help them when they act in their 
role as the traditionally weak party in other situations. 
However, the shifts in power relations also have effects across contexts. 
In today’s technology-mediated world, the person enacting citizenship, 
employeeship, and consumption is becoming a digital persona living in a 
myriad of databases, who may have less control over the specific role she is 
playing in different contexts. The labor context extends to non-labor time 
and space, where private activities may be monitored by employers enforcing 
their company policy of having “good” employees.187 The consumer is 
digitized into interesting information segments that are distributed across 
networks and used to build profiles.188 Citizens’ activities are recorded and 
stored in databases regardless of whether there is a preexisting suspicion that 
they engage in criminal acts. Frequently, these databases are controlled by 
private parties such as telecom providers or airline carriers. In this way, 
private sector architectures for doing business are being adapted to meet 
public policy goals of crime and terrorism fighting.189 Internet Service 
 
 185. See ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 282–305 (1980). 
 186. On participatory governance, see, for example Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation 
in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2006). 
 187. See supra Section IV.C. 
 188. Dholakia and Zwick state that 
With privacy dispossession, the consumer most significantly loses the 
power over his or her representation as consumer in the market. Someone 
else’s image of what the consumer might be takes on a real existence. These 
synthesized representations of the consumer “self” are being distributed 
through information entrepreneurs to the databases of the world.  
Dholakia & Zwick, supra note 159, at 17; see also supra Section V.C. 
 189. See supra Section III.D. 
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Providers are increasingly harnessed as nodal points to monitor and 
intervene in the enforcement of private and public rights and duties.190 
In this world of interconnected or interconnectable databases, digital 
representation is slowly but surely overtaking physical presentation in face-
to-face contacts: the “data double is more real tha[n] the person behind it.”191 
The digital persona of the citizen–employee–consumer increasingly functions 
as her interface in the power relations with the government–employer–
producer, resulting in decisions based on data stored in databases.192 These 
databases, however, generally do not intrinsically retain the original context 
of the data stored in them. When function creep leads to data being 
exchanged and used in other contexts, the primary context often is lost. The 
power and attractiveness of databases lie not only in their persistence and 
comprehensiveness, but also in their multifunctionality. The logic of a world 
that thrives on databases is therefore at odds with purpose specification and 
use limitation, two important principles of the data protection framework. 
Today, I seriously doubt that purpose specification and use limitation 
continue to play a substantial role in practice. 
The transformation of a person playing different roles in context-rich, 
face-to-face situations into a person interacting in different power relations 
through the interface of a context-poor but potentially information-rich 
digital persona has important implications for self-presentation and identity 
construction.193 Goffman describes how roles are typically played before the 
same or similar audiences: 
 
 190. Koops & Leenes, supra note 125, at 118 (“An interesting aspect of this Internet 
Panopticon is that the state shifts the responsibility of enforcement to entities in the private 
sector, such as Internet service providers (ISPs).”); see also EGBERT DOMMERING, 
GEVANGEN IN DE WAARNEMING. HOE DE BURGER DE COMMUNICATIEMIDDELEN 
OVERNAM EN ZELF OOK DE BEWAKING GING VERZORGEN (2008); Jonathan Zittrain, 
Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 653 (2003). 
 191. Maria Los, Looking Into the Future: Surveillance, Globalization and the Totalitarian 
Potential, in THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE 69, 86 (David Lyon ed., 2006). 
 192. SOLOVE, supra note 66; see Roger Clarke, The Digital Persona and Its Application to Data 
Surveillance, 10 INFO. SOC’Y 77 (1994); Los, supra note 191, at 87 (noting that “both actuarial 
calculations and data-matching procedures constantly produce real consequences for 
individuals represented by their ersatz doubles”). 
 193. Los, supra note 191, at 78. Los notes that  
the fragmented, decontextualized information, collected for many specific 
purposes, may acquire a multitude of completely different meanings 
depending on its particular compilation, re-contextualization and 
application. As well, because of the ramified nature of data neworks, it 
appears practically impossible to correct erroneous or twisted 
information. In this context, the notion of biographical truth loses any 
meaning. 
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[d]efining social role as the enactment of rights and duties attached 
to a given status, we can say that a social role will involve one or 
more parts and that each of these different parts may be presented 
by the performer on a series of occasions to the same kinds of 
audience or to an audience of the same persons.194 
How can a person present herself—or her self—as a digital person when 
it is almost impossible to know from the outset what her audience will be? 
Which social role can or should she play in her guise as a digital persona 
performing multiple functions in public–private database conglomerations? 
And can the presentation of the self be at all controlled by the person when 
the presentation is digitized in databases? Altogether, the shifts in power 
relations of the citizen–employee–consumer and the associated mixing of 
contexts could well become responsible for a digital identity crisis.195 
C. PANOPTICISM AND NORMALIZED IDENTITY 
A digital identity crisis is, however, not the necessary outcome of the 
shifts in power relations studied. Besides the shattering of the person across 
databases, a second development is taking place: panopticism.196 In all three 
power relations, to greater or lesser degrees, this mechanism at play is 
distinguished. The citizen–employee–consumer is increasingly being watched 
in and across the different contexts in which she acts. The awareness that any 
activity may be observed has a potentially self-disciplining effect, through 
which the person embraces society’s paradigm of normality and starts to 
behave accordingly.197 
Panopticism also affects identity construction. Profiling is a key 
technology that causes shifts in all three power relations studied, because it is 
associated with panopticism and may, through panoptic logic, affect the 
freedom of persons to construct their identities.198 Through the double 
 
Id. 
 194. GOFFMAN, supra note 178, at 16 (emphasis added). 
 195. Cf. Los, supra note 191, at 85 (“The new logic of late-modern surveillance, typified 
by the data double, dehumanization of freedom and de-socialized criteria of sorting, suggests 
a special form of biographical uprooting, whereby for many people a caring relationship with 
their peripatetic, de-contextualized virtual double(s) is likely to become a major 
preoccupation.”). 
 196. See supra Section II.A. 
 197. It should be noted that awareness of the average person of being watched through 
data surveillance may currently be fairly low. It is expected to rise, however, with the increase 
of personal experiences, media stories, and growing intrusiveness of surveillance practices. 
See Los, supra note 191, at 77, 80–81. 
 198. See supra note 137 and surrounding text; see also Hildebrandt, supra note 68, at 305–
11. 
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anticipation that is at work in identity building, the panoptic embracing of the 
“system’s” paradigm of normality has a major impact on the resulting 
identity. The digital personae that represent the person in today’s database-
based power relations constitute their identity as much as they are constituted by 
the person’s self-presentation in everyday life. Where panopticism is at work, 
there is little difference between an imposed persona (i.e., the representing 
profile imposed by a counter-party) and a projected persona (i.e., the self-
representing profile controlled by the person herself)199: both reflect the 
prevalent paradigm of how someone is supposed to behave.200 
Here, we can observe the third dimension of power at work: the socially 
structured and culturally patterned practices of institutions of government, 
labor, and consumption reinforce existing imbalances in the power relations. 
The weak parties see no other option but to embrace their (self-)imposed 
normalized digital personae as constituting who they are, rather than 
challenging their digital personae to represent the persons they want to be. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
After the tour d’horizon of developments in the power relations between 
government–citizen, employer–employee, and business–consumer and the 
integrated vision of the identity of today’s citizen–employee–consumer, it is 
time to return to the questions posed at the outset. What technology-related 
shifts occur in power relations in the domains of government, labor, and 
commerce? And what are the consequences of these shifts for the legal 
protection of weak parties, in particular, for existing mechanisms of 
inequality compensation in the associated legal domains? 
This Part begins with a summary of the shifts in power relations 
discussed previously. Next, a discussion follows of the consequences for legal 
protection: first, within the realms of criminal, labor, and consumer law, and 
subsequently, beyond context-specific forms of inequality compensation. The 
analysis highlights the importance of having a comprehensive data protection 
framework. This Article concludes with a sketch of two alternative directions 
for such a framework to protect citizens in today’s cross-context database 
society. 
 
 199. Clarke, supra note 192. 
 200. Cf. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE POWER OF IDENTITY 7 (1997) 
(“Although . . . identities can also be originated from dominant institutions, they become 
identities only when and if social actors internalize them, and construct their meaning 
around this internalization.”). Panopticism precisely has such an internalizing effect. See also 
Los, supra note 191. 
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A. SHIFTS IN POWER RELATIONS 
With the development of new technologies—in particular ICT, but also 
genetic applications—power relations shift in various ways. Most shifts relate 
to an increase in information: both the traditionally strong parties (i.e., 
governments, employers, business) and the traditionally weak parties (i.e., 
citizens, employees, consumers) use ICT, and sometimes DNA techniques, 
to improve their information position. These shifts do not counterbalance 
each other. Rather, they are asymmetrical: they involve different types of 
information, different situations, and—particularly in the government 
context, but probably also in commerce—different sub-groups that are 
affected. Although the weak parties can use their improved information 
position to resist or bypass the power exercise of the strong parties, in many 
cases, the strong parties can use their improved information position to 
exercise power even more strongly and in different ways. 
Particularly in the government and employment context, the 
empowerment of the strong party fundamentally affects the character and 
scope of the power relation. Criminal law is shifting from a reactive, 
incidental, last-resort mechanism to a preventative, comprehensive, and 
primary regulatory mechanism. Since this reshaping of criminal law involves 
massive-scale data collection, storage, and profiling of unsuspected citizens, 
the nature of the government–citizen relationship is slowly changing. 
Citizens are treated less as prima facie trustworthy subjects and more as 
prima facie risk objects. 
A similar development, although much smaller in scale and scope, can be 
seen in the employment context, where employers are now monitoring their 
employees on a routine basis and also increasingly in off-duty situations. A 
crucial consequence of the changed nature of these power relations is that 
contexts are broadened and become intertwined: the data involved in the 
“risk management” of citizens and employees are stored in interconnected or 
interconnectable databases. Here, the commerce sector also enters the 
picture, since several of these databases are outsourced to third parties. These 
third-party information brokers or intermediaries then fill or merge the data 
of such databases with that of the commercial databases. Thus, database and 
profiling technologies are facilitating the rise of comprehensive monitoring 
systems that move between and across different contexts. 
An important feature of the technology-facilitated changes in the nature 
of power relations is the rise of “governing through crime,” which implies 
that the contexts of crime (and criminal law) and other sectors of society 
(and their associated areas of law) are increasingly overlapping. Particularly in 
the United States, but also visible on a smaller scale in the Netherlands, many 
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types of relationships are increasingly cast in risk discourse and governed by 
mechanisms derived from or based in criminal law. These mechanisms 
include, for example, crime language, offender statistics, and sanctioning 
policies.201 Many common spaces—schools, the family, the workplace—are 
adopting “practices suggestive of the penal aspects of criminal justice.”202 For 
example, the U.S. Safe Schools Act of 1994 created a “national model of 
crime governance for schools,” encompassing zero-tolerance policies, 
disciplinary violations categorized as quasi-crimes, in-school detention 
systems, and data collection systems for (quasi-)crime monitoring.203 In 
divorce cases, allegations of crimes committed by the partner have emerged 
as a primary argument in contested child custody and property distribution 
proceedings.204 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 comprises a “one strike 
and you’re out” standard to evict tenants from public housing when she or 
“any guest or other person under the tenant’s control” commits a drug-
related offense on- or off-premises.205 It is a strict liability standard that 
would permit a landlord to evict a mother for drugs her daughter 
possessed.206 The “governance through crime” mechanism here is that the 
“exclusionary power associated with criminal designation [is also used] to 
accomplish other organizational goals (like ridding schools of poor test takers 
or ridding public housing of waiting lists) . . . .”207 
In this altering landscape of context-crossing power relations, two 
overarching trends stand out: the use of digital personae as a substitute for 
the physical persons of the weak parties in power relations, and the creation 
of panoptic risk-governing architectures that have a potentially self-
disciplining effect on the weak parties. Some individuals from the category of 
traditionally weak parties may use the new technological opportunities to 
effectively resist the power exercised by the traditionally strong party. 
However, the combination of these trends implies that many, if not most, 
individuals within the weak-party categories face new, difficult to counter, 
and more diffuse, context-crossing, and subtle forms of power exercise by 
the strong parties. 
 
 201. Simon, supra note 69, at 221. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 214–31. Illustrative is the Ruffner Middle School (Norfolk, Virginia) 
mandatory uniform policy. “Students who come to school without a uniform are subject to 
in-school detention,” which is reported as successful in improving student behavior: 
“throwing objects is down 68 percent and fighting has decreased by 38 percent.” Id. at 225. 
 204. Id. at 192. 
 205. Id. at 194–95. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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B. CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL PROTECTION 
The shifts in power relations raise questions about the ability of current 
mechanisms to compensate weak parties for structural inequalities. The case 
studies in this Article have uncovered insufficiencies or inadequacies in 
current legal protection. Each legal field—criminal, constitutional, 
administrative, labor, and consumer law—requires adaptation to meet the 
new reality. This has already partly been achieved, for example, with the 
introduction of consumer protection rules in e-commerce legislation and the 
creation of guidelines for responsible monitoring of employees.208 
However, much remains to be updated. For example, adequate 
protection against the use of new applications, such as familial DNA 
searching or behavioral advertising, must be devised. This is a matter of 
course: the law usually lags behind technological developments, and it is 
unsurprising that legal-protection mechanisms will eventually be adapted or 
created for such new developments. 
The U.S. legal system is arguably better equipped than the Dutch legal 
system to achieve this because its reliance on case-law besides statutory law 
ensures that it can relatively swiftly adapt to new technological realities. 
Constitutional review allows modern-day re-interpretation of age-old 
constitutional protection provisions.209 Furthermore, its statutes frequently 
contain open norms that can be flexibly interpreted by the courts,210 and its 
greater reliance on the market also allows for more flexibility. 
Nevertheless, the flexibility and use of open, re-interpretable norms in 
the U.S. approach also have drawbacks for legal protection, since the legal 
norms can easily and docilely follow technological and market developments 
rather than actively shape these developments. For example, this is visible in 
 
 208. See supra notes 113–14, 153–56 and accompanying text. 
 209. In the Netherlands, constitutional review by the courts is unconstitutional. 
GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [GW.] [Constitution] art. 120 
(Neth.). A Bill is pending to amend this (Kamerstukken II, 2001–2002, 28 331 (Neth.)), but 
it is dubious whether this Bill will be adopted in the foreseeable future. The Dutch 
constitutional system is therefore much more rigid, leading to technology-specific 
constitutional provisions, like the freedom of the printing press and the secrecy of 
telegraphy, becoming outdated without legal certainty with respect to “new” technologies 
like the Internet. For a comparison of the Dutch and American approaches to “digital 
constitutional rights,” see Bert-Jaap Koops & Marga Groothuis, Constitutional Rights and New 
Techonologies in the Netherlands, in CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (R. Leenes et al. eds., 2008) and Susan W. Brenner, Constitutional Rights 
and New Technologies in the United States, in CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (R. Leenes et al. eds., 2008). 
 210. For example, in the requirements for interceptability of telecommunications, see 
supra Section III.B. 
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the erosion of privacy protection through the technology-facilitated erosion 
of reasonable expectations of privacy.211 Technology and the market are not 
usually allies of weak parties, and hence, the law should have firm 
mechanisms in place when it is to provide protection to weak parties in the 
face of technology-related shifts in power relations. It remains to be seen 
whether, in general, the more flexible and responsive, but also more fluid and 
market-oriented character of the U.S. approach is better able to meet the 
challenges of providing legal protection in power relations than the slower 
and more rigid, but also more principled and paternal character of the Dutch 
approach. 
Regardless of the specifics of legal systems and concrete changes that 
may need to be made in specific areas of law, two general conclusions can be 
drawn on legal protection of weak parties. One problem resides in the shift 
from a reactive, incident-driven approach to a preventative, comprehensive 
approach. It is most obvious in criminal justice, but it is also visible in other 
contexts where risk governance is gaining ground. Legal protection of weak 
parties in a reactive, incident-driven system tends to focus on preventing or 
redressing grave errors that may incidentally occur, for example, sending an 
innocent person to jail or having an ignorant consumer declared bankrupt 
after being lured into buying a high-risk financial product. When the system 
becomes preventative and comprehensive, however, the vulnerability does 
not lie solely in incidental major errors or injustices, but in frequent minor 
errors or injustices. Examples include wrongly blacklisted passengers being 
detained at airports for a few hours, employees forced to explain with 
occasional embarrassment what they (or their cars) were doing at dubious 
locations, children’s rights organizations finding their websites blocked by 
overzealous child pornography filtering systems. Such relatively small 
inconveniences, with minor damage, will not be set right by legal-protection 
mechanisms based on the old paradigm of addressing incidental grave errors. 
The law should therefore be supplemented with new forms of legal 
protection that can prevent or redress adequately the overall functioning of 
comprehensive risk-governing systems. This means introducing more 
administrative and accountancy-type checks and balances, such as regular 
audits by independent supervisors monitoring the fairness of policies and 
practices, low-threshold complaint mechanisms with teeth to call the strong 
 
 211. Koops & Leenes, supra note 125 (finding that technology does not incorporate 
privacy norms and erodes reasonable expectations of privacy); Phillips, supra note 49, at 59 
(“This reliance on the market as a policy mechanism for privacy protection reinforces and 
exacerbates unequal power relations between employers and employees.”). 
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parties to order, and liberal compensation mechanisms for people suffering 
inconveniences and smaller injustices.212 
A second overarching problem that needs to be addressed is the gap 
between law in the books and law in action. This problem occurs most 
notably in data protection but also in employment law (e.g., the difficulty of 
achieving redress) and consumer law (e.g., the lack of individual access to 
justice through dispersion of damage). The gaps in data protection and 
privacy law are systemic, and in the era of databases, profiling, ubiquitous 
computing, and Ambient Intelligence,213 law in the books has reached the 
limits of its powers. As a result, legal protection should not only be 
articulated in written law, but also in the socio-technical infrastructure itself. 
Both PETs and transparency enhancing technologies (TETs) must be 
developed that embed legal rules in present and future ubiquitous 
technologies.214 The same may well apply to other areas of legal protection, 
including legal mechanisms in labor and consumer law, which are difficult to 
enforce in today’s technology-pervaded world. “Code as law” will be required 
to supplement law in the books if weak parties are to be effectively 
protected.215 
C. BEYOND CONTEXT-SPECIFIC INEQUALITY COMPENSATION 
It is insufficient to adapt legal protection, as outlined in the previous 
Section, only within each specific area of law where inequality-compensating 
protection mechanisms are found. The search for legal protection of weak 
parties should not be restricted to the specific context of their concrete role 
as citizen, employee, or consumer. On the contrary, the key challenge of 
updating inequality compensation in light of technology-related shifts in 
power relations lies in finding ways to empower individuals with means to 
develop themselves and to construct their identities in a technology-mediated 
 
 212. G.G. Fuster & P. De Hert, PNR and Compensation: How to Bring Back the 
Proportionality Criterion, in ARE YOU WHO YOU SAY YOU ARE? THE EU AND BIOMETRIC 
BORDERS 101, 108 (2007) (“The [compensation] mechanisms as envisaged in this paper will 
offer potentially many more benefits than mere individual redress. Their efficiency in 
generating collective benefits, however, relies ultimately on the generosity of the 
compensation. . . .”); Koops, supra note 64. 
 213. Ambient Intelligence refers to the concept of sensor-equipped environments that 
respond in real-time to the people moving around in them. See generally THE NEW 
EVERYDAY: VIEWS ON AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE (Emile Aarts & Stefano Marzano eds., 
2003) (discussing Ambient Intelligence, its potential, implications and potential problems). 
 214. M. Hildebrandt & Bert-Jaap Koops, The Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection 
in the Profiling Era, 73 MOD. L. REV. 428 (2010). 
 215. Employing “code as law” is easier said than done if it is to be both effective and 
legitimate. See id. This is one of the major challenges for future interdisciplinary research. Id. 
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world that obfuscates the audiences for which they play their different roles 
as citizens, employees, and consumers. 
The main trends in the shifts in power relations are the use of context-
poor digital personae and the creation of panoptic monitoring 
architectures.216 The resulting vulnerabilities are increased risks of errors in 
interpretation, as well as a normalizing, self-disciplining effect of the panoptic 
architectures on individuals’ behavior and identity construction. Both of 
these trends and vulnerabilities are related to the fact that myriads of 
personal data are stored and processed in diverse power relations, and 
possibly exchanged across contexts. The key issue is who is allowed to 
process which data for which purposes and under which conditions. In other 
words, data protection turns out to be the major mechanism that deals with 
the key issue in reducing vulnerabilities emerging through the shifts in power 
relations. If people are to be protected against abuses of power in the era of 
databases and profiling, then some form of data protection is crucial. 
Furthermore, this data protection should be generic rather than context-
specific because the audiences of digital personae are far less clearly 
distinguishable than the audiences for physical, role-playing persons. 
The European, general approach to data protection is more adequate in 
that respect than the context-specific, piecemeal approach of the United 
States, but the comprehensive European approach to data protection also 
faces considerable challenges. For instance, as discussed above, the European 
approach must deal with the sustainability of the purpose-specification and 
use-limitation principles in a database-pervaded world,217 the gap between law 
in the books and law in action, and the consequent need to build in PETs 
and TETs in socio-technical architectures.218 
Can a comprehensive data protection framework actually meet all these 
challenges, in order to provide cross-context inequality compensation to the 
citizen–employee–consumer, as represented by her proxy, the digital 
persona? In other words, can data protection be made to empower people to 
control their digital personae to such an extent that they can resist the abuse 
of power by different strong parties in diverse and opaque situations? In 
theory, it can. How it can achieve this, however, is a matter of debate. The 
literature seems to suggest two radically different directions for empowering 
persons. 
 
 216. See supra Section VII.A. 
 217. Supra Section VI.B. 
 218. Supra Section VII.B. 
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D. TWO DIRECTIONS TO EMPOWER PERSONS 
1. The Orthodox View: Resistance by Data Limitation and User Control 
The first way in which persons can be empowered to resist the exercise 
of power by diverse strong parties in the face of ubiquitous databases and 
profiling, is to make the current data protection framework more effective. 
This approach uses a two prong strategy to empower data subjects to gain 
and retain a substantial level of control over their personal data in the world’s 
myriad databases, as well as over their digital personae. The first prong 
requires that purpose-specification and use-limitation principles remain 
cornerstones of data protection, and hence, limits are set on who can access 
and process which personal data for which purposes. To meet the realities of 
today’s database world, however, these limits may be less strict in terms of 
preventing data processing. This is then compensated by stronger 
requirements for making the processing, particularly if used for other 
purposes, more transparent to and challengeable by data subjects. The other 
prong is that these limits and requirements are to be enforced more 
effectively in practice than is the case today, particularly by using PETs and 
TETs. 
Advocates for this approach are typically the data-protection 
community—a loose network of professionals and scholars aiming to 
develop and preserve data protection, including Data Protection Authorities 
and Information Commissioners, privacy advocates, and experts in the field 
of data security.219 This approach builds on Nissenbaum’s notion of 
“contextual integrity,” which presents a context-sensitive “justificatory 
framework for prescribing specific restrictions on collection, use, and 
dissemination of information about people.”220 This approach explores 
possibilities to achieve “privacy in the clouds,” where cloud computing and 
Web 2.0 call for identity-management systems that are under the control of 
users; these possibilities include technical and organizational solutions, such 
as open-source software, federated identity management, multiple and partial 
identities, audit tools, and data-centered or “sticky” policies.221 The vision of 
 
 219. The latter is exemplified in the title of the German journal Datenschutz und 
Datensichterheit [Data Protection and Data Security], the authorship and readership of which 
constitute a significant part of the continental data protection community. 
 220. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 155 (2004); 
see also Avner Levin & Patricia Sánchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 1001, 1051 (2009) (arguing that even when people voluntarily disclose personal 
information on the web such as on social network sites, a reasonable expectation of privacy 
remains as long as the information remains inside the network in which it was disclosed). 
 221. Ann Cavoukian, Privacy in the Clouds, 1 IDENTITY INFO. SOC’Y 89 (2008); see also Jan 
0973-1036 KOOPS WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2010 10:44 AM 
1032 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:973 
 
Ambient Intelligence, in this approach, is to be realized by architecture-
embedded Ambient Law in the form of PETs and TETs.222 In short, this 
approach holds that by harnessing technology through technology, a new and 
more effective generation of context-sensitive data protection can be 
achieved. 
2. The Radical View: Resistance by Data Proliferation and Looking in 
Return 
The second approach to empowerment is more unorthodox and radically 
different. The power of panoptic architectures can be resisted, in this 
approach, by beating the observers at their own game. This resistance can 
take a number of manifestations. For example, using the method of the “Jam 
Echelon Day,” in which the Anglo-Saxon intelligence snooping network 
Echelon was to be clogged by including in each e-mail message a signature 
with fifty “red-flag” words,223 panoptic observers can be overwhelmed by 
creating such enormous haystacks of personal data that the needles are 
hopelessly lost. Another manifestation of this type of resistance is 
exhibitionism—disclosing a complete digital persona online that is fully 
visible in order to preempt others from constructing a digital persona for 
you. By anticipating imposed personae and exhibiting “adult” versions of 
their projected persona, people can retain a sense of control in the 
construction of their identity.224 
Unorthodox as this approach may be, it aligns with other developments 
in the network society, such as crowdsourcing, viral marketing, free 
 
Camenisch et al., Privacy and Identity Management for Everyone, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
2005 WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 20–27 (2005); Marco Casassa Mont 
et al., Towards Accountable Management of Identity and Privacy: Sticky Policies and Enforceable Tracing 
Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON DATABASE AND 
EXPERT SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS 377 (2003); PRIME-Privacy-Enhanced Identity 
Management in Europe, http://www.prime-project.eu (last visited Sept. 25, 2009). 
 222. Mireille Hildebrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: 
LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 175, 188–89 (Roger 
Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008). 
 223. An example of an Echelon-jam-generated e-mail signature is: “ATF DOD WACO 
RUBY RIDGE OKC OKLAHOMA CITY MILITIA GUN HANDGUN MILGOV 
ASSAULT RIFLE TERRORISM BOMB DRUG KORESH PROMIS MOSSAD NASA 
MI5 ONI CID AK47 M16 C4 MALCOLM X REVOLUTION CHEROKEE HILLARY 
BILL CLINTON GORE GEORGE BUSH WACKENHUT TERRORIST.” Chris Oakes, 
Monitor This, Echelon, WIRED, Oct. 22, 1999, http://www.wired.com/print/politics/law/-
news/1999/10/32039/. 
 224. Dholakia & Zwick, supra note 159, at 1 (noting that “exhibitionism and voyeurism 
seem to offer new tools for consumer resistance against the electronic surveillance systems 
in networked markets and are inextricably interwoven with consumers’ desire for control 
over their information”); see also supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
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distribution of goods as a new business model, and a “pirate’s” approach to 
information dissemination,225 all of which involve an extreme proliferation of 
data and a re-evaluation of the value attached to those data. 
Besides data proliferation, the most pertinent manifestation of this type 
of resistance is the vision of David Brin, who proposes the strategy of 
looking in return.226 In Brin’s view, checks and balances in a panoptic 
surveillance society are to be found in monitoring the monitors, not only by 
independent supervisors, but also and more importantly, by the people 
monitored: “we may not be able to eliminate the intrusive glare shining on 
citizens of the next century, but the glare just might be rendered harmless 
through the application of more light aimed in the other direction.”227 By 
increasing transparency on all sides, a bottom-up coalition of amateur 
watchers will scrutinize the monitoring practices of the powerful: “the 
cameras are coming. You can rail against them, shaking your fist in futile rage 
at all the hovering lenses. Or you can join a committee of six billion 
neighbors to control the pesky things, making each one an extension of your 
eyes.”228 In this radical view, the glaring light of ubiquitous transparency is 
not incompatible with privacy; on the contrary, it safeguards privacy by its 
unique power to hold accountable those who violate privacy.229 The power of 
knowledge may be wielded by data-collecting, strong parties, but abuse of 
power will immediately be brought to light by the power of numbers of weak 
parties who can scrutinize all the strong parties’ actions. 
E. CONCLUSION: NO MIDDLE WAY 
This Article argues that technology-related shifts in power relations call 
for revision of the legal protection of weak parties, in particular, of 
mechanisms of inequality compensation. Part of this should be achieved by 
updating existing mechanisms in the associated legal domains, by critically 
reviewing existing provisions in criminal, administrative, labor, and consumer 
 
 225. See, e.g., CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE 3 (2009) 
(discussing a new business model in which many people are “making lots of money charging 
nothing”); CHARLES LEADBEATER & PAUL MILLER, THE PRO-AM REVOLUTION: HOW 
ENTHUSIASTS ARE CHANGING OUR SOCIETY AND ECONOMY (2004) (discussing the 
counter-trend of Pro-Ams, “innovative, committed and networked amateurs working to 
professional standards,” and their impact on society); MATT MASON, THE PIRATE’S 
DILEMMA: HOW YOUTH CULTURE IS REINVENTING CAPITALISM (2008) (describing how 
youth culture and trends have influenced society). 
 226. DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO 
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998). 
 227. Id. at 23. 
 228. Id. at 333. 
 229. Id. at 334. 
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law, to assess their ability to protect weak parties in light of shifts in power 
relations that empower the strong party, particularly when power is exercised 
in new ways.230 However, sector-specific legal protection is not enough. We 
also need a comprehensive approach to protect individuals in a world where 
they interact with different strong parties through digital personae across 
contexts and in pervasively monitoring architectures. Such a comprehensive 
approach is most likely to be found in data protection: enforceable rules that 
regulate who can process which data for which purposes under which 
conditions. 
However, it is unclear how empowerment of data subjects can best be 
achieved to meet the reality of today’s database and profiling era. The 
dominant, orthodox strand in the literature favors the current European 
approach to data protection, focusing on data limitation and user control, 
and suggesting a concerted attempt to make this work in practice by 
implementing context-sensitive PETs and TETs. In contrast, a subsidiary, 
radical strand in the literature favors user-generated data maximization and 
counter-surveillance strategies based on transparency to resist the exercise of 
panoptic power. 
Both directions for the next generation of data-protection frameworks 
have potential, and either will be a challenge to achieve. However, there is no 
middle path: the approaches of data limitation and data proliferation are 
incompatible with one another. We will have to choose between the 
orthodox and the radical approach. And while the debate continues, digital 
personae and panoptic architectures will continue to proliferate, playing into 
the hands of the powerful, and the citizen–employee–consumer of the 
database era will face an ever harder job to resist the exercise of those 
powers. A consistent approach to achieve effective data protection must be 
decided upon soon. 
If the orthodox way does not prove successful in the coming years, then, 
perhaps, we should collectively shift to the radical way. 
VIII. POSTSCRIPT: UMBERTO ECO’S ANOPTICON 
The radical way will, like all radical suggestions, seem far-fetched and 
fraught with questions of feasibility. I will leave aside discussing these 
questions here, as they require considerable further research, and end instead 
with a visionary metaphor for the radical way, which can serve as a welcome 
 
 230. See supra Section VII.B. 
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contribution to the post-Foucauldian literature on panopticism and how to 
resist it: Umberto Eco’s Anopticon.231 
The Anopticon is a hexagonal building which effectuates “the principle 
of ‘being able to be seen by everyone without seeing anyone.’ ”232 The 
Anopticon’s subject is a prison guard who lives in a closed, central hexagonal 
room, illuminated by a few conical embrasures which allow some light to 
shine through from above, but which do not permit the prison guard to see 
anything other than a small circular portion of sky. Around the prison 
guard’s room are the prison’s corridors where the prisoners can walk around 
freely. 
From these corridors encircling the central room, the prisoners can 
watch the prison guard through conical embrasures, in such a way that the 
prison guard can not know when he is being observed, nor by whom. In fact, 
[t]he Anopticon does not allow the prison guard to have any 
control over the rest of the prison: he can not surveil the prisoners, 
he can not prevent their escape, he can not even know if there are 
any prisoners left nor whether anyone is watching him, and, 
supposing that someone were watching him, the prison guard is 
not capable of knowing whether it is a prisoner or an occasional 
visitor of this machine-à-laisser-faire (see also the married machines 
and The virgin dressed by her other spouses).233 
As in the radical view of a maximally transparent society, Umberto Eco’s 
Anopticon provides a new answer to the traditional question “Quis custodiet 
custodes?” It is we, the watched, who should watch the watchers. 
 
 231. Umberto Eco, L’Anopticon, in IL SECONDO DIARIO MINIMO 176 (1992). 
 232. Id. (translation by Bert-Jaap Koops). 
 233. Id. (translation by Bert-Jaap Koops). The virgin dressed by her other spouses is an inverse 
reference to Marcel Duchamp, The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (The Large Glass) 
(sculpture) (1923), which recalls associations of the work’s machine-like appearance and of 
its Panopticon-suggestive nickname, “The Large Glass.” 
0973-1036 KOOPS WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2010 10:44 AM 
1036 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:973 
 
 
